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Changing Paradigms: The Liability of Corporate 
Groups in Germany 
RENE REICH-GRAEFE· 
The German law on affiliated companies and groups of companies 
("Konzernrecht"), as embodied in the German Stock Corporation Act of 
1965, as amended ("Aktiengesetz"),1 has often been credited for its innova­
tive approach2 to the dichotomy of liability strategies relevant to corporate 
groups-viz., the traditional concept of entity liability based on the funda­
mental doctrine of the legal separateness of the corporate entity and, ac­
cordingly, resulting in a limitation of investor liability as the rule, and dis­
crete and rare occurrences of what is almost poeticall~ designated the 
Visiting Associate Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. LL.B., Free University 
of Berlin School of Law, 1996. LL.M., University of Connecticut School of Law, 1997. An earlier 
version of this Article was presented at the United Technologies Corporation Symposium, "The Chang­
ing Face of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations: Entity vs. Enterprise Liability," held by the Connecti­
cut Law Review on October 21, 2004. I am indebted to Phillip Blumberg and Kurt Strasser for their 
helpful comments and support on earlier drafts of this Article. All errors are mine. With the exception 
of citations to German court decisions, I have tried to limit the references below to those materials on 
the German law of corporate groups which are available in English and which should be accessible 
either online (as stated) or through most law libraries in the United States. 
I German Stock Corporation Act [hereinafter AktG] §§ 291-318, translated in HANNES SCHNEI­
DER & MARTIN HEIDENHAIN, THE GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT: BILINGUAL EDITION WITH AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW 265-95 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter SCHNEIDER & HEIDENHAIN). An up-to­
date German version of the German Stock Corporation Act is available at 
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrechtlaktg/index.html(last visited Mar. 9, 2005). 
2 See, e.g., JOSE ENGRACIA ANTUNES, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE GROUPS 314 (1994); PHILLIP I. 
BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS IN THE BANKRUPTCY OR REORGANIZATION 
OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING THE LAW OF CORPORATE GUARANTIES 642­
43 (1985); Carsten Alting, Piercing the Corporate Veil in American and German Law-Liability of 
Individuals and Entities: A Comparative View,2 TuLSA J. COMPo & INT'L L. 187,250-51 (1995); Karl 
Hofstetter, Parent Responsibility for Subsidiary Corporations: Evaluating European Trends, 39 INT'L 
& COMPo L.Q. 576,579 (1990); Handel C. H. Lee & David M. Blumental, Parent Company and Share­
holder Liability: "Piercing the Veil" of Chinese Corporate Subsidiaries, 5 Bus. L. INT'L 221, 226 
(2004); Sandra K. Miller, Piercing the Corporate Veil Among Affiliated Companies in the European 
Community and in the U.S.: A Comparative Analysis of u.s., German, and U.K. Veil-Piercing Ap­
proaches, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 73, 100 (1998); Yuwa Wei, Corporate Groups and Strategic Alliances: 
New Reform Instruments to the Chinese, 30 DENY. J.INT'L L. & POL'y 395, 398 (2002). 
3 See Marcus Lutter, Limited Liability Companies and Private Companies, in 13 INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 2, § 203, at 102 (1998) ("In such situations, liability is 
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"piercing of the corporate veil" ("DurchgriffshaJtung") as narrow and re­
luctantly crafted exceptions, and the more modem, revolutionary concept 
of group or enterprise liability ("KonzernhaJtung") in the law of corporate 
groups which-in its most radical form-will allow (and even mandate) a 
court to penetrate all horizontal and vertical "corporate separateness barri­
ers" within a collective, polycorporate business enterprise as the rule and 
without exception.4 
Indeed, one of the most prolific international scholars on the liability of 
corporate groups, Professor Jose Engracia Antunes, has repeatedly de­
scribed such innovative German approach to the legal phenomenon of in­
tragroup liability as a "third intermediate and differentiated regulatory 
strategy."s Comparatively, he labels such intermediate strategy­
intermediate, since it is structurally situated somewhere between the tradi­
tional, well-established nineteenth century notions of entity law6 and the 
rather contemporary, yet often still embryonic formulations of enterprise 
imposed on individual members on the principle that justice is better served by 'disregarding the com­
panyas a separate legal entity' or, more poetically, by 'lifting or piercing the corporate veil' .") (empha­
sis added); see also T.W. Cashel, Groups ofCompanies-Some US Aspects, in GROUPS OF COMPANIES 
20,26 (Clive M. Schmitthoff & Frank Wooldridge eds., 1991) ("Piercing, or lifting, the corporate veil 
is a colourful figure of speech."). 
4 For a general discussion of such dichotomy, see ANTUNES, supra note 2, at ch. 3; PHILLIP I. 
BLUMBERG, KURT A. STRASSER, NICHOLAS L. GEORGAKOPOULOS, & ERIC J. GoUVIN, BLUMBERG ON 
CORPORATE GROUPS §§ 6.01, 6.05 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS]; 
Jose Engracia Antunes, The Liability ofPolycorporate Enterprises, 13 CONN. J. lNT'L L. 197,215-21 
(\999). 
5 Antunes, supra note 4, at 221; see also ANTUNES, supra note 2, at 313; cf Alting, supra note 2, 
at 250 (stating that the German Konzemrecht has even enacted the principle of enterprise law). 
6 See BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 4, §§ 3.04[D][2], 6.02,10.02 n.l; PHILLIP 
I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT, AND OTHER COMMON LAW 
PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 7-38 (1987); 
STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1 :3, at 1-13 (2004); Alting, supra note 2, at 
192; Phillip I. Blumberg, The Increasing Recognition ofEnterprise Principles in Determining Parent 
and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities, 28 CONN. L. REv. 295, 330 (1996); Cashel, supra note 3, at 24; 
Thomas Raiser, The Theory ofEnterprise Law in the Federal Republic ofGermany, 36 AM. J. COMPo L. 
111, 111 (1988); see also Richard M. Buxbaum, The Formation ofMarketable Share Companies, in 13 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 3, § 70, 37-38 (\974) (describing the 
English landmark case Salomon V. A. Salomon & Co.. Ltd., [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.), which formulates 
such notions for English law, as "that bulwark oflegal formalism and economic liberalism"); Benjamin 
J. Richardson, Enlisting Institutional Investors in Environmental Regulation: Some Comparative and 
Theoretical Perspectives, 28 N.C. 1. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 247, 294-95 (2002) ("The cardinal principle 
in Western corporate law is the axiom that the company is a separate legal person from the members 
who comprise it. A corollary principle is that absent exceptional circumstances, investors in the com­
panyare not liable beyond the amount they invest.") (citations omitted). 
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liability-the "dualist approach.,,7 
Part I of this Article will briefly summarize the dualistic fabric of the 
group liability schemes promulgated under the German Stock Corporation 
Act of 1965. However, being far from even remotely regulating much of 
today's operational and legal reality within corporate groups in Germany, 
Part II will juxtapose the statutory dualist approach discussed in Part I with 
a parallel "case law"g development in the German law of corporate groups 
which, until recently, had all but dwarfed the significance of the statutory 
framework provided under the German Stock Corporation Act. Such par­
allel development, the emergence of the so-called "qualified de facto cor­
porate group doctrine" during the 1980s in the jurisprudence of the German 
Federal Supreme Court ("Bundesgerichtshof'-abbreviated "BGH"), un­
expectedly experienced in 2001 and 2002 what will be diagnosed by this 
Article as a tectonic, multi-layered paradigm9 shift ("Paradigmenwechsef') 
in the German law of intragroup liability. Such vital change of group law 
paradigms is evidenced by the Federal Supreme Court's complete aban­
donment of the qualified de facto corporate group doctrine-a process 
which Part III of this Article will explore in more detail. Finally, Part IV 
will analyze and evaluate the various layers and characteristics of the diag­
nosed paradigm shift as well as its consequences for the liability concepts 
applicable to corporate groups under German law and discussed herein. In 
conclusion, this Article will argue that, because of the aggregate effect of 
the identified paradigm shift, a truly substantive dualist (or hybrid) ap­
proach addressing the parent-subsidiary liability conundrum under German 
law (which approach Professor Antunes was still able to attest as late as 
1999\0) today, de lege lata, no longer exists in such jurisdiction. 
7 Antunes, supra note 4, at 221; see also ANTUNES, supra note 2, at 313 (describing the German 
legal system's differentiated "dualist approach"); Herbert Wiedemann, The German Experience with 
the Law 0/Affiliated Enterprises, in GROUPS OF COMPANIES IN EUROPEAN LAWS 21, 33 (Klaus J. Hopt 
ed., 1982) (describing the differentiation between contractual and factual concerns in the German 
regulatory system of corporate groups, as discussed in Part I, infra, as a "dualistic system"). 
g For an explanation of the quotation marks around German, i.e., civil law jurisdiction "case law" 
throughout this Article, see infra note 75 and accompanying text. 
9 Cf Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Microcorporatist Structures in German Law on Groups o/Compa­
nies, in REGULATING CORPORATE GROUPS IN EUROPE 317, 319 (David Sugarman & Gunther Teubner 
eds., 1990) ("It is undeniable that, in German law specifically, considerable improvements on the part 
of both case law and jurisprudence have been made in the legal machinery and in methods for under­
standing and treatment of group enterprise, but it does seem best in this outline to keep to the approach 
that characterizes (German) law in force: the paradigm, if you will, of group enterprise law.") (empha­
sis added) (citation omitted); Raiser, supra note 6, at 114 ("Enterprise law emphasizes the size of an 
enterprise instead of the legal form of the company. Its paradigm is the large firm, especially the 
corporation. Its attention is directed especially to enterprise relationships and to the need to develop 
appropriate legal structures for them.") (emphasis added). 
10 See Antunes, supra note 4, at 221. 
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1. THE DUALISTIC FABRIC-THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
Unlike the corporations codes of each of the fifty state jurisdictions 
constituting the United States which, in unison, remain silent on the topic 
of general parent-subsidiary liability,lI German corporate law has articu­
lated explicit standards for the liability of parent company-shareholders (as 
opposed to individual investor-shareholders) in the statutory corporate 
group framework. Forty years ago, the German Federal Government 
promulgated a new version of the Stock Corporation Act and, in an un­
precedented step at the time,12 included provisions in such act which de­
vised two specific categories of corporate groups and then applied different 
liability schemes to each ofthem. 13 
A. The Contractual Concern 
The first such statutory group category is that of the "contractual cor­
porate group" or "contractual concern" (" Vertragskonzern,,).14 True to its 
name, the contractual group is based on a voluntary, contractual arrange­
ment, the "control agreement" ("Beherrschungsvertrag"Y 5 between the 
controlling parent company and the controlled subsidiary corporation. 16 
Pursuant to the control agreement, the parent acquires, and is permitted to 
exercise, far-reaching management powers over the subsidiary and its op-
II See LUITER, supra note 3, § 203, at 102. 
12 See Assmann, supra note 9, at 339--40 (stating that the "Third Section of the Stock Corporation 
Law (AktG)" is a "product of the Stock-Corporation-Law Reform of 1965"); Wei, supra note 2, at 398 
("Germany was the first country to have a separate legal regime, here in the form ofthe Aktiengesetz, as 
a way of regulating groups of companies."); Eddy Wyrneersch, Do We Need a Law on Groups ofCom­
panies, in CAPITAL MARKETS AND COMPANY LAW 573, 587 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wyrneersch eds., 
2003) ("Germany is the only European state that has introduced formal regulation on the law of com­
pany groups."). Today, Brazil (1976) and Portugal (1986) have also adopted regulatory frameworks for 
corporate groups. See ANTUNES, supra note 2, at 313,324-27; BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 643 ("In 
the German Stock Corporation Act of 1965 applicable to public stock corporations (Aktiengesellschaji, 
or A.G.), the German Federal Republic has enacted the most comprehensive statutory scheme for 
corporate groups (Konzem) in the world.") (citations omitted). 
13 For an account of the history of the corporate group sections of the German Stock Corporation 
Act, see ANTUNES, supra note 2, at 342--47. 
14 See Thomas Stohlmeier, German Limited Liability Company-Unlimited Liability of Parent 
Company?, 21INT'LBus. LAW. 135, 137 (1993). 
15 This is sometimes also called a domination agreement. See, e.g., ANTUNES, supra note 2, at 
320, 342; Heribert Hirte, The European Private Company: A German Perspective, in THE EUROPEAN 
PRIVATE COMPANY? 95,101 (Harm-Jan De Kluiver & Walter Van Gerven eds., 1995); Lee & Blumen­
tal, supra note 2, at 227-28; Maximilian Schiess I, The Liability ofCorporations and Shareholders for 
the Capitalization and Obligations ofSubsidiaries under German Law, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 480, 
497 (1986); Bernd Singhof, Equity Holders' Liability for Limited Liability Companies' Unrecoverable 
Debts-Reflections on Piercing the Corporate Veil Under German Law, 22 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMPo 
L. REv. 143,165 (1999). 
16 See AktG § 291(1), translated in SCHNEIDER & HEIDENHAIN, supra note I, at 265. 
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erations. 17 It is even permissible under the statute that the parent com­
pany's directions and corporate influence are detrimental to the subsidiary 
as long as such directions meet two requirements. First, they have to be 
consistent with the interests of the global business enterprise, i.e., the cor­
porate group as a whole. 18 And second, they may not jeopardize the sepa­
rate legal existence of the subsidiary corporation. 19 Thus, in other words, 
in a contractual concern the parent company may have complete control 
over the subsidiary and its business operations, provided that the exercise 
of such control is in the best interest of the corporate group and does not 
render the subsidiary insolvent. 
Given that the contractual group is premised on a contractual arrange­
ment,20 the Stock Corporation Act does not utilize any "corporate law em­
blems" of intragroup liability in order to address the legal consequences of 
the extensive, yet permissible corporate control over the subsidiary corpo­
ration. Rather than obliterating the parent company's limited liability as 
the shareholder of the controlled subsidiary, the German stock corporation 
law applies a contractual response-a hybrid form of "statutory­
contractual" quid pro quo--which obliterates the parent company's limited 
liability as the contractual counter-party of its controlled subsidiary?1 By 
operation of law, the parent company entering into the control agreement 
with its subsidiary and thereby forming the contractual group assumes a 
statutory obligation--created by virtue of the mere existence of the control 
agreement-to compensate the subsidiary for all annual deficits incurred 
by such controlled entity during the contract period (i.e., the time period 
during which the control agreement is in effect).22 It should be noted that 
such global compensation liability of the parent company is incurred irre­
spective of any factual relationship, or even the slightest causal link, be­
tween the subsidiary'S losses and the actual control exercised by the parent 
company. 
17 See AktG § 308(1), translated in SCHNEIDER & HEIDENHAIN, supra note I, at 284; see also 
Antunes, supra note 4, at 222. 
18 AktG § 308(1), translated in SCHNEIDER & HEIDENHAIN, supra note I, at 284; see Hofstetter, 
supra note 2, at 581; Singhof, supra note 15, at 165; Wiedemann, supra note 7, at 26; Frank 
Wooldridge, Aspects of the Regulation of Groups of Companies in European Laws, in EUROPEAN 
COMPANY LAWs-A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 103, 119 (Robert R. Drury & Peter G. Xuereb eds., 
1991). 
19 Hofstetter, supra note 2, at 581; Schiess I, supra note 15, at 497. 
20 However, the contractual form is prescribed by law and the controlling entity can force the 
conclusion of the control agreement at any time. 
21 More precisely, the parent company itself obliterates, i.e., waives, its limited liability as the 
shareholder of the controlled subsidiary corporation by concluding the control agreement with such 
entity. 
22 See AktG § 302(1), translated in SCHNEIDER & HEIDENHAIN, supra note I, at 275-76; see also 
Hofstetter, supra note 2, at 581; Singhof, supra note 15, at 165; Stohlmeier, supra note 14, at 136; 
Wiedemann, supra note 7, at 36. 
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From an accounting perspective, the balance sheet of a contractual 
group subsidiary can never show any losses.23 Any fiscal loss of the sub­
sidiary will automatically be offset with a compensation claim by the sub­
sidiary against the parent corporation as an account receivable in like 
amount. At the same time, the parent company is obligated to immediately 
create and, if necessary, increase sufficient reserve amounts in order to 
cover the fiscal loss incurred by the subsidiary.24 At the end of the fiscal 
year, such reserve amounts become payable to the subsidiary?S Should the 
parent corporation refuse to pay, the creditors of the subsidiary are able to 
enforce the subsidiary's compensation claim against the parent company 
under applicable German bankruptcy provisions.26 
B. The Factual Concern 
The second category of corporate groups created by the Stock Corpora­
tion Act of 1965 is the factual concern or de facto concern ("faktischer 
Konzern,,).27 Also true to its name, the factual concern or group is charac­
terized by the absence of a control agreement (or any other contractual 
arrangement between parent and subsidiary addressing the group issue). 
Instead, the de facto group is a "pure-bred" statutory creation that comes 
into existence as a matter of law once two factual requirements have been 
met. First, majority ownership of a particular corporation by another com­
pany is established-which, under the Stock Corporation Act, creates a 
presumption of the lack of independence of the majority-owned corpora­
tion.28 Second, a uniform, centralized management structure ("einheitliche 
Leitung") is applied to the majority-shareholder company and the major­
ity-owned corporation, i.e., both companies are operated as a single, cen­
tralized enterprise ("Konzern") as far as corporate management and control 
are concerned.29 
23 See Ulrich lmmenga, Company Systems and Affiliation, in 13 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 7, § 75, at 83 (1985); Miller, supra note 2, at 102. 
24 See AktG § 300 No.3, translated in SCHNEIDER & HEIDENHAIN, supra note 1, at 275; see also 
Assmann, supra note 9, at 342; Lee & Blumental, supra note 2, at 228; Miller, supra note 2, at 102--D3. 
25 See AktG § 302(1), translated in SCHNEIDER & HEIDENHAIN, supra note 1, at 275-76; Klaus 1. 
Hopt, Legal Elements and Policy Decisions in Regulating Groups ofCompanies, in GROUPS OF COM­
PANIES 81, 94 (Clive M. Schmitthoff & Frank Wooldridge eds., 1991); Immenga, supra note 23, at 83. 
26 See Alting, supra note 2, at 237; Hofstetter, supra note 2, at 581; Wooldridge, supra note 18, at 
121. 
27 See Stohlmeier, supra note 14, at 137. 
28 See AktG §§ 16(1), 17(2), translated in SCHNEIDER & HEIDENHAIN,SUpra note 1, at 35-37; see 
also Hofstetter, supra note 2, at 581; Miller, supra note 2, at 101; Stohlmeier, supra note 14, at 137; 
Wiedemann, supra note 7, at 32. 
29 AktG § 18(1), translated in SCHNEIDER & HEIDENHAlN, supra note 1, at 37; see also Assmann, 
supra note 9, at 341 (discussing the "unitary management" that results when a dominating company 
and (one or more) dependant companies become a group); Hopt, supra note 25, at 95 ("[I]t remains true 
that under German law a Konzem only exists if there is not just control, but one or more controlled 
enterprise is subject to the uniform management of the controlling enterprise.") (emphasis added); 
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The consequences of the de facto concern, thus established, on the par­
ent company's liability for the debts of its dependent subsidiary follow an 
entirely different statutory scheme from the one applicable to contractual 
groups. Here, the Stock Corporation Act provides that in any case of a 
particular interference by the parent company in the subsidiary's manage­
ment-which interference is disadvantageous to the independent business 
interests of the subsidiary-the parent company shall compensate the sub­
sidiary for any and all damages sustained as a result of such singular inter­
ference. 3o Obviously, liability in de facto groups is thus a case-by-case, 
interference-by-interference analysis of intragroup liability. 
As a result, the scope of liability in de facto concerns is very limited, 
both as a matter of "legal formalism" and a matter of "legal realism." Re­
garding the former, the form of the liability structure in German factual 
groups can be compared to veil piercing cases in the United States. Instead 
of incurring a full-scale liability for all subsidiary debts (as is applied to the 
German contractual concern regardless of any actual detriment caused by 
the parent's control), intracompany liability in factual concerns focuses on 
isolated cases of detrimental parental interferences where, in addition to the 
disregard for the subsidiary's "separate existence" as expressed in the uni­
form, centralized management structure establishing the de facto group, 
there is some form of additional "wrongful conduct" by the parent com­
pany harming the subsidiary. Furthermore, intracompany liability also 
requires a causation nexus between the detrimental measure taken by the 
parent company and the damages or losses sustained by the subsidiary. It 
therefore further limits recovery by the subsidiary to only those losses 
which have been directly caused by a particularized, harmful interference 
with the corporate autonomy of such entity.31 
As far as the "legal realism" limitation of the scope of de facto group 
liability in Germany is concerned, it is evident from the restrictive statutory 
Wiedemann, supra note 7, at 25 (noting that the Konzern "presupposes" sole management by the domi­
nant company); Wooldridge, supra note 18, at 108 (discussing what may constitute a controlling inter­
est on the part of the dominant company); Frank Wooldridge, The Situation ofDependent GmbH in a 
de facto Group in German Law, 19961. Bus. L. 627, 629 n.7 (noting the role that uniform management 
plays in defining a group of companies, as well as the circumstances in which uniform management is 
"treated as existing"); Wymeersch, supra note 12, at 587 n.49 (noting that under the German Stock 
Corporation Act, '''uniform management' or 'einheitlicher [sic] Leitung' is the essential criterion"). 
30 AktG §§ 311 (I), 317(1), translated in SCHNEIDER & HEIDENHAIN, supra note 1, at 287, 293­
94; see also Miller, supra note 2, at 104; Singhof, supra note 15, at 166. 
31 See Antunes, supra note 4, at 223 ("[T]he parent has only to compensate concretely established 
patrimonial prejudice caused to the subsidiary."). Comparatively, it could therefore be claimed that the 
three-prong liability structure for factual groups under the German Stock Corporation Act (i.e., uniform 
management, detrimental interference, causation nexus) is identical to the three-factor liability pattern 
(i.e., separate existence, wrongful conduct, causation) which is often utilized in veil piercing cases in 
the United States. For a discussion of the traditional U.S. three-stage veil piercing pattern, see BLUM­
BERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 4, §§ 1O.03[B], 11.01; Hofstetter, supra note 2, at 592; Kurt 
A. Strasser, Piercing the Veil in Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L. REv. 637, 640--41 (2005). 
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scheme for factual group liability as described above that the controlled 
subsidiary would be required to establish-for each individual, particular 
interference by the parent company-that such interference was detrimen­
tal and, in addition, the extent to which actual damages resulted therefrom 
(i.e., as opposed to other particular parental interferences or even to 
autonomous, "self-constituted" causes).32 Though, at the time of such rele­
vant, particular interference by the parent company, the same subsidiary 
would be fully embedded in the de facto group and subjected to its uni­
form, centralized management (i.e., the controlling feature under the Stock 
Corporation Act constituting the de facto group). In other words: In corpo­
rate reality, the factual concern will often be characterized by highly 
interconnected companies with a multitude of parental interferences­
probably even on a day-to-day basis. Procedurally, it will therefore often 
be impossible for a highly controlled subsidiary to point to one particular 
parental interference as the sole (or, at least, controlling) cause ofa particu­
lar, stand-alone damage that it has suffered (and will be able to quantify 
with the precision necessary for recovery).33 Thus, shedding some "light of 
realism" on the corporate group provisions in the German Stock Corpora­
tion Act, it should come as no surprise that apparently only one successful 
suit against a parent company based on de facto concern compensation 
liability has been reported in the last forty years.34 
32 See SchiessI, supra note 15, at 50 I. 
33 See Alting, supra note 2, at 238 ("Because of the difficulty stating a cause of action, which re­
quires proof of the transaction's disadvantage to the subsidiary including specific damages incurred, 
commentators view the legal means in a de facto Konzem as ineffective.") (emphasis added); id at 
240-41 (summarizing the various legal and factual obstacles for the realization of a compensation 
claim in the de facto group); Buxbaum, supra note 6, § 78, at 40; Hopt, supra note 25, at 103 ("[T]he 
practical difficulties of establishing the responsibility and of substantiating the damage are consider­
able.... Even if the damage can be established it is still necessary to show that it is caused by the 
parent. If the members of the management board of the subsidiary make a credible statement that they 
have acted without having been ordered or induced to act by the parent, this is often the end of the 
matter."); Miller, supra note 2, at 105 ("[T]he controlled entity must prove that the controlling enter­
prise caused it to be put at a disadvantage in a specific transaction. Damages must be proved. Under 
the German legal system this burden of proof may be difficult to sustain, particularly in light of the lack 
of pretrial discovery allowable and the absence of corporate rules permitting shareholders to obtain 
comprehensive information."); Schiessl, supra note 15, at 501 ("At a certain level of domination and 
integration of the two companies it becomes nearly impossible to insulate a single transaction and to 
assess the damages."); Singhof, supra note 15, at 167 ("At a certain level of domination and integra­
tion, it becomes virtually impossible to isolate the detrimental transactions (instructions) and their 
nexus to losses, to assess the damages, or to identifY violations of the duty ofloyalty."). 
34 See BGH (Mar. I, 1999 - II ZR 312/97), BGHZ 141,80 = Betriebs Berater [BB], 54 (1999), 
1022 = Der Betrieb [DB], 52 (1999), 951 = GmbH-Rundschau [GmbHR], 90 (1999), 660 = Juristische 
Rundschau [JR] (2000), 282 = Juristenzeitung [JZ], 55 (2000), 156 = Monatsschrift fur Deutsches 
Recht [MDR], 53 (I999), 823 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 52 (I999), 1706 = Neue 
Zeitschrift fur Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG], 2 (1999), 658 = Zeitschrift fur Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht 
(Wertpapier-Mitteilungen IV) [WM], 53 {I999), 850 = Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP], 20 
(1999), 708; Silja Maul, Commentary, Neue Zeitschrift fur Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG], 2 (I999), 658 
(660) ("The foregoing decision-apparently-represents the first decision of the Federal Supreme 
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Almost as a "domino effect" of such procedural difficulties in enforc­
ing parent company liability in factual corporate groups, the number of 
contractual concerns in Germany is relatively smal1.35 When taking into 
account a legal reality characterized by only a very remote liability expo­
sure as a de facto concern parent, why would such majority-shareholder 
company ever deliberately enter into a control agreement, become a con­
tractual group parent and incur liability for all of the subsidiary's losses­
even in the possible complete absence of any detrimental interference or 
actual loss causation?36 
Court with respect to Sections 311 et seq. AktG in the 34 years since the enactment of such statute.") 
(original in German). Regarding the jurisprudential status prior to such decision, see Hofstetter, supra 
note 2, at 582 ("The provisions about the de facto concern in the German Stock Corporation Act have 
remained almost a dead letter. Successful actions for damages under these provisions are apparently 
unknown. The reason lies in high enforcement costs and risks. Proof of detrimental interference on a 
transaction-by-transaction basis is very difficult to establish, where the businesses of parent and sub­
sidiary corporations have been highly interconnected.") (citations omitted); Schiessl, supra note IS, at 
501 n.114 ("Successful claims under AktG § 317 are unknown."); Wiedemann, supra note 7, at 37 
("According to secs. 317, 318 AktG, the dominant enterprise is liable to the dependent company, as 
well as to the creditors and shareholders of the latter, for damages if compensation is not made for the 
transactions or measures it has occasioned. The plaintiff must prove that all these prerequisites are 
present. The claim becomes void if the management board of the dependent company declares that the 
combine[d] management had not occasioned the transaction in question. Successful claims under secs. 
317-318 AktG are for this reason unknown."). 
Similarly applying a "reality-check" on the corporate group provisions in the German Stock Cor­
poration Act, Professor Antunes even diagnoses a "dangerous gap between law and reality," i.e., be­
tween the "real organizational-governance structure" used by a corporate group in the concrete case and 
the "juridical model" under the Stock Corporation Act. ANTUNES, supra note 2, at 366; see also id. at 
376 (diagnosing "serious gaps between law and reality in the treatment of intragroup liability issues 
(hybrid forms of centralized factual groups and decentralized contractual groups)"); Antunes, supra 
note 4, at 224 ("[A]n inevitable gap between law and reality emerges whenever, as it often happens, the 
living governance structures of groups in the concrete cases at hand diverge from that juridical 
model."). 
35 For discussions of existing empirical data, see ANTUNES, supra note 2, at 331 n.314; Hof­
stetter, supra note 2, at 581 n.43. 
36 See BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 645 ("[l]n the absence of voluntary acceptance of liability, the 
West German parent is, generally speaking, no more liable for the debts of its subsidiaries than its 
counterparts in other countries imposing such familiar fiduciary obligations."); Hopt, supra note 25, at 
94. Indeed, it has often been claimed that contractual concerns in Germany are primarily entered into 
not for corporate control purposes but-in the absence of check-the-box elections under German corpo­
rate tax law-for purposes of income tax consolidation (so-called "Organschaft") and the exploitation 
of related tax efficiencies. See, e.g., ANTUNES, supra note 2, at 331-32 ("To be sure, the conceptual 
and technical failure of the system of §§ 311 ff. AktG has given cause indirectly to the devaluation of 
the figure of the domination contract (whose only possible attractiveness rests in the tax advantages of 
the so-called 'Organschaft'): today, as yesterday, corporate groups are creating and sustaining their 
governance structures without any apparent need to place them under a contractual charter and without 
apparently being worried by the (theoretically) heavier restrictions laid down by the system of factual 
groups on the exercise of their factual power of control.") (citations omitted); BLUMBERG, supra note 2, 
at 644; Hofstetter, supra note 2, at 580 (noting that German tax laws may grant preferred treatment 
when there is a control agreement); Wooldridge, supra note 18, at 119 (stating that control contracts 
"are really only of interest from the point of view of taxation"); Wooldridge, supra note 29, at 628 
("There are no special advantages from the viewpoint of company law in concluding control contracts 
with GmbH. However, sometimes profit transfer contracts are concluded with such companies for tax 
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II. THE DUALISTIC FABRIC-THE "CASE LAW" FRAMEWORK 
Though not widely used or applicable in practice, the group liability 
schemes enacted under the German Stock Corporation Act, in particular 
the one controlling the de facto concern, proved to possess a significant 
"contagious" effect on a second area of German corporate law not regu­
lated by the Stock Corporation Act (or any other corporate statute).37 This 
kind of parallel development in the German law of corporate groups-i.e., 
parallel to the statutory group liability context outlined above-particularly 
applied to corporate group structures in which the controlled subsidiary 
was not a German stock corporation ("Aktiengesellschaft"-abbreviated 
"AG") but a limited liability company ("Gesellschafi mit beschriinkter 
Hafiung"-abbreviated "GmbH"). 
The corporate group provisions in the German Stock Corporation Act 
(as well as the entire act itself) only regulate corporate groups involving 
AG subsidiaries.38 However, in many cases, the AG corporate vehicle will 
be employed as a publicly held entity,39 i.e., not as a group subsidiary,40 
and will be the larger of the two mainstream types of German companies as 
far as its usual size is concerned. In contrast, the German limited liability 
company, generally smaller in size when compared to an AG, typically 
involves only a limited number of shareholders (and often only a single 
shareholder-individual or institutional) and, despite its name, is more akin 
to a U.S. closely held corporation than a U.S.-style LLC.41 Notwithstand­
ing the fact that a GmbH subsidiary is not regulated by the group provi­
sions of the German Stock Corporation Act, corporate groups with both 
German and foreign parent companies have used wholly or majority­
owned GmbH companies extensively in order to organize their respective 
reasons. "); Wiedemann, supra note 7, at 29-31 (providing a detailed summary of the basic Organschaft 
rules). 
37 Hofstetter, supra note 2, at 579 (commenting that the German statutory group liability schemes 
have "spurred the evolution of an advanced German judge-made law outside the ambit of the Stock 
Corporation Act"). 
38 See Alting, supra note 2, at 237; Assmann, supra note 9, at 329; Hofstetter, supra note 2, at 
579,582; Schiessl, supra note 15, at 499; Daniela Weber-Rey, Insolvency ofa German Limited Liabil­
ity Company: De Facto Shareholders. Group Liability for Individual Shareholders, 7 PACE INT'L L. 
REv. 523, 526 (1995); Wiedemann, supra note 7, at 24; Wooldridge, supra note 18, at 119; 
Wyrneersch, supra note 12, at 587. 
39 PRESSER, supra note 6, § 5:5, at 5-8 to 5-9; Franck Chantayan, An Examination ofAmerican 
and German Corporate Law Norms, 16 ST. JOHN'S 1. LEGAL COMMENT. 431, 434-35 (2002); Miller, 
supra note 2, at 96. 
40 See Hop!, supra note 25, at 82 ("In Germany, by the end of 1988, there were only 2,373 stock 
corporations as compared with about 400,000 GmbH and probably considerably more than 60,000 
GmbH & Co.: more and more subsidiaries take a form other than that of a stock corporation, for exam­
ple that ofa GmbH or even a partnership.") (citations omitted). 
41 See Chantayan, supra note 39, at 434; Miller, supra note 2, at 99. 
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subsidiary businesses in Germany.42 In doing so outside of the scope of 
any statutory regulatory framework as far as parent liability to subsidiary 
creditors is concerned,43 the German judiciary ultimately intervened and, 
beginning in the late 1970s,44 developed a separate legal doctrine applica­
ble to the so-called "qualified de facto concern" ("qualijizierter faktischer 
Konzern") which usually involves a dependent GmbH subsidiary in place 
of the controlled AG.45 
42 See PRESSER, supra note 6, § 4:3, at 15-16; Hirte, supra note 15, at 96; Hofstetter, supra note 
2, at 582; Hopt, supra note 25, at 81 ("According to a recent survey the autonomous corporate enter­
prise belongs largely to the past and at least 40 per cent. of the GmbHs representing 90 per cent. of the 
capital of all such companies belong to groups."); Miller, supra note 2, at 98; Stohlmeier, supra note 
14, at 136; Wiedemann, supra note 7, at 24 (stating that in 1965, twenty percent of all limited liability 
companies in Germany were already dependent entities); Wooldridge, supra note 29, at 628. 
43 To date, the German Limited Liability Company Act of 1892, as amended ("Gesetz betreffend 
die Gesellschaften mil beschriinkter Haftung"), does not include any provision on affiliated companies 
or corporate groups involving a GmbH. Cf Stohlmeier, supra note 14, at 136 (noting that the German 
law pertaining to companies of limited liability does not address the direct liability of a controlling 
shareholder); Wiedemann, supra note 7, at 38 ("The position of a limited liability company dependent 
upon another enterprise is not governed by statute, although the limited liability company represents 
probably the most widespread form of dependant subsidiary."). Elaborate proposals for a reform of the 
German Limited Liability Company Act, including the adoption of statutory provisions addressing the 
GmbH group, were prepared in the early 1970s by the "Arbeilskreis GmbH-Reform" (GmbH Reform 
Committee) but never became law. See Assmann, supra note 9, at 329; Hirte, supra note 15, at 102 
n.34. However, such proposals also regulated and provided the groundwork for the qualified de facto 
group doctrine eventually adopted by the German courts and discussed here. Cf Wiedemann, supra 
note 7, at 28 ("The proposals of the GmbH Reform Committee, which worked out a scheme for the 
strict regulation of the qualified enterprises, are trail-blazing.") (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
An up-to-date German version of the German Limited Liability Company Act is available at 
http://bundesrecht.juris.de!bundesrechtlgmbhg/index.html(last visited Mar. 9, 2005). A current Eng­
lish hardcopy version of the Act is included in BURKHARDT MEISTER ET AL., THE GERMAN LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANY (6th ed. 2005). 
44 The Gervais decision by the Federal Supreme Court of 1979, BGH (Feb. 5, 1979 - II ZR 
210/76), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 33 (1980), 231, is often seen as the judicial inception 
of the qualified de facto group doctrine. See, e.g., Hofstetter, supra note 2, at 583. 
45 See A1ting, supra note 2, at 234 ("Additionally, there is the concept of qualified (centralized) 
de facto domination which has no statutory basis and was developed by the Bundesgerichtshof, in the 
context of a dominated GmbH."); id. at 242-43 (explaining why the qualified de facto group will al­
most inevitably involve a GmbH subsidiary, and that the court decisions establishing the qualified de 
facto doctrine were all in the context of a GmbH); see also Miller, supra note 2, at \05 ("Although the 
contractual Konzem and the De Facto Konzem apply by operation of statute to controlled corporations 
that are public corporations, the qualified De Facto Konzem arises by judicial construction typically in 
the context of the private limited liability company or GmbH."). The "qualified" de facto group or 
"qualified" factual concern has been described in general terms to include: 
those non-contractual corporate groups with a centralized organizational-governance 
structure where the parent corporation exercises a permanent intrusion in and control 
over the entire business affairs of the subsidiary, not only at the level of its strategic 
management, but also at the level of its operational and day-to-day management, and 
where, in consequence, the protective system for the factual subsidiary corporation 
and its affected constituencies of §§ 311 ff. AktG is virtually ruled out. 
ANTUNES, supra note 2, at 368 (emphasis added); see also Singhof, supra note 15, at 167 ("When a 
parent corporation controls and operates its subsidiary, denying it any direction of its own, and refuses 
to allow it any opportunity to make an arm's length profit, a court may rely on the notion of 'material 
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Under this doctrine, once fully developed by the German Federal Su­
preme Court, a qualified de facto corporate group was characterized by a 
parent company which exercised a long-standing and pervasive power of 
control ("andauernde und umfassende Leitungsmacht") over the business 
affairs of the subsidiary company.46 Once a parent company was found to 
be "permanently and extensively'>47 involved in the management of its sub­
sidiary, German courts accepted that a legal presumption was created to the 
effect that the parent company had not shown ample consideration and 
respect for the independent business interests and autonomy of its subsidi­
ary.48 As a result of such presumption, if the parent company was unable 
to successfully defend itself in court, it was held personally liable to the 
creditors of the subsidiary for all of the subsidiary's obligations.49 
The remarkable result of this judge-made "case law" doctrine in Ger­
many was that, by a single stroke of the Federal Supreme Court in a 1985 
landmark case, the so-called Autokran decision,50 it remedied all of the 
statutory shortcomings applicable in the AG factual group context dis­
cussed above. First, it shifted the burden of proof to the parent company, 
asking such majority shareholder to provide exculpatory evidence that its 
continued interference with the affairs of the subsidiary was not detrimen­
tal to such entity. Second, and equally important, the qualified de facto 
concern doctrine blended the statutory liability concepts applicable to con­
tractual and factual concerns under the Stock Corporation ACt.51 Similar to 
or qualified control' to justify holding the parent company liable ...."). Due to the limited scope of 
this Article, the following discussion will only focus on the qualified factual GmbH group (where the 
controlled subsidiary is organized as a limited liability company as opposed to a stock corporation). 
46 See BGH (Sept. 16, 1985 - II ZR 275/84), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 39 (1986), 
188 (191) (Autokran); see also Hofstetter, supra note 2, at 583; Stohlmeier, supra note 14, at 136; 
Weber-Rey, supra note 38, at 526. 
47 See BGH (Sept. 16, 1985 - II ZR 275/84), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 39 (1986), 
188 (~opsis 2.) (Autokran) ("dauemd und umJassencf'); see also ANTUNES, supra note 2, at 441. 
8 See Alting, supra note 2, at 243; Hofstetter, supra note 2, at 583; Miller, supra note 2, at 76, 
84; Schiessl, supra note 15, at 505; Weber-Rey, supra note 38, at 531; Wooldridge, supra note 29, at 
631. 
49 See BGH (Sept. 16, 1985 - II ZR 275/84), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 39 (1986), 
188 (191) (Autokran). For a comprehensive summary of this doctrinal development (which would be 
beyond the scope of this Article), including a detailed discussion of the milestone decisions by the 
German Federal Supreme Court establishing the qualified factual group doctrine, see ANTUNES, supra 
note 2, at 440-55; Alting, supra note 2, at 244-47; Weber-Rey, supra note 38, at 526-29. See also 
Wooldridge, supra note 29, at 627 (offering a brief summary). 
50 See BGH (Sept. 16, 1985 - II ZR 275/84), BOHZ 95, 330 = Betriebs Berater [BB], 40 (\985), 
2065 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 39 (\986), 188 = Zeitschrift rur Wirtschafts- und Bank­
recht (Wertpapier-Mitteilungen IV) [WM], 39 (1985), 1263 (Autokran). For a summary of this case, 
see ANTUNES, supra note 2, at 440-44; Miller, supra note 2, at 105"'{)6; Singhof, supra note IS, at 167­
68. 
51 The Federal Supreme Court developed and repeatedly justified the qualified de facto group 
doctrine by an analogous application of the contractual concern liability scheme as provided in §§ 302­
03 AktG and discussed in Part I.A, supra. See, e.g., BGH (Sept. 16, 1985 - II ZR 275/84), Neue Ju­
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the conclusion of a control agreement as the single, controlling factor in 
order to create the contractual concern and to thereby, ipso facto, establish 
unlimited liability by the parent company for all debts of the contracting 
AG subsidiary, it became sufficient for the qualified factual concern to 
exist,52 i.e., to be created by a single, controlling factor-viz., the "perma­
nent and extensive" involvement by the parent in the management of its 
subsidiary.53 This very fact, together with a complete absence of any focus 
by the courts on particular interferences and any evaluation of their respec­
tive, specific detrimental effect and causation link to the actual damages 
suffered by the subsidiary (which had proved inhibitive to intragroup liabil­
ity in factual groups as shown in Part I.B), again resulted in an unlimited 
liability of the parent company with respect to all debts of the "disre­
spected" GmbH subsidiary. Finally, by also granting creditors of the sub­
sidiary a direct claim against the parent company, this parallel development 
in the German law of corporate groups designed by the courts (with ample 
assistance by the legal commentators), in sum, created a very powerful and 
compelling strategy of intragroup liability which, in order to use Professor 
Antunes's classification again, indeed, operated as a hybrid or "dualist ap­
proach,,54 in the otherwise antagonistic spectrum created by entity liability 
on the one hand and enterprise liability on the other hand. 55 
ristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 39 (\986), 188 (synopsis 2. & 191-192) (Autokran); BGH, (Mar. 29, 
1993 - II ZR 265/91), Neue luristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 46 (1993), 1200 (synopsis I.) (TBB); see 
also PRESSER, supra note 6, § 4:4; Alting, supra note 2, at 220, 235, 249; Hirte, supra note IS, at 101­
02; Weber-Rey, supra note 38, at 526; Wooldridge, supra note 29, at 632-33,636. 
52 This occurs at least in those cases in which the parent company could not overcome the detri­
mental-effect presumption. This is so in most cases. Cf Schiessl, supra note IS, at 505 ("Since it is 
rarely possible to show that no transactions were disadvantageous to the subsidiary, only one legal 
consequence can follow. Insofar as the parent company is able to prove that the losses of the subsidiary 
are not caused by the Konzern relationship but by an external factor, such as a nationwide crisis, the 
parent company will not be held liable by the court.") (emphasis added). 
53 Cf Antunes, supra note 4, at 218 ("By conceiving the polycorporate group as a sort of verti­
cally-controlled, unitary enterprise with a highly centralized governance structure whose organizational 
axle (parent corporation) exercises complete control over the various subunits (subsidiaries), this strat­
egy imposes liability of the parent corporation as following automatically from the very existence ofthe 
polycorporate group.") (emphasis added). 
54 In this respect, the "dualist" fabric of the German law of corporate groups not only refers to the 
dualistic system of the statutory framework outlined in Part I, supra, i.e., the dogmatic differentiation 
between contractual and factual concerns in the German Stock Corporation Act, but-more generally­
also to its intermediate, regulatory dominion between the opposing principles of entity law and enter­
prise liability (which intermediate dominion is therefore constantly exposed to, and thus, at the same 
time, nurtured and delineated by a sphere of tensive public policy conflicts created between such two 
irreducible poles). 
55 Cf Hofstetter, supra note 2, at 595-96 (discussing the respective challenges associated with 
entity and enterprise liability); Wei, supra note 2, at 400 (stating that the German model of intragroup 
liability is "definitely closer to economic reality, and the adoption of this model is beneficial in terms of 
reducing practical and theoretical complexities associated with providing an appropriate legal system to 
govern corporate groups") (citation omitted); Wooldridge, supra note 29, at 638 (commenting that 
decisions such as Autokran and TBB were "of seminal importance in the development of German 
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III. THE DUALIST FABRIC-THE DECONSTRUCTION 
Encouraged by such parallel development in the jurisprudence of the 
Federal Supreme Court, corporate law scholars in Germany started to dis­
cuss what could be called a "reverse contagious" effect of the qualified 
factual group doctrine-viz., that the German courts would use the more 
progressive, enterprise-liability oriented approach to intragroup liability 
employed under such doctrine in order to revive the unworkable, "coma­
tose,,56 de facto group liability provisions of the Stock Corporation Act.57 
Eventually, one could have also imagined German "case law" to com­
pletely transcend the piecemeal structure of the divergent regulatory 
schemes applicable to the liability of corporate groups in Germany and to 
overhaul such structure with uniform, fully harmonized intragroup liability 
company law, and the adoption of a more sophisticated approach to certain of the problems of groups 
of companies than does English law"). Klaus Hopt, commenting with respect to the Autokran decision 
of the BGH, wrote: 
The court held the defendant liable, but not on the basis of piercing the corporate 
veil. Under German law this concept is only applied by way of exception, and is re­
served, for example, for cases where there is confusion of the assets of two compa­
nies or persons, or where other clear abuses exist. Instead the court based its deci­
sion on principles of the law of groups which it developed freely when deciding the 
case. 
Hopt, supra note 25, at \04. 
56 Cf Assmann, supra note 9, at 345 (commenting on "[t]he failed arrangements for 'de facto 
groups' in the Stock Corporation Law, widely regarded as in need of reform"); Hofstetter, supra note 2, 
at 582 ("The provisions about the de facto concern in the German Stock Corporation Act have re­
mained almost a dead letter."); Schiess I, supra note 15, at 501 ("In practice, the concept of balanced 
safeguards did not tum out to be feasible. The compensation system in the de facto Konzern did not 
work when the parent company took such complete control of the subsidiary's finances, policies, and 
practices that the subsidiary had no direction of its own.") (citation omitted); Wooldridge, supra note 
18, at 119 ("There is a general consensus that the provisions of German law governing de facto groups 
and simple dependency relationships have not worked well, and have caused business men to make use 
of the de facto rather than the contractual groups. There is clearly no case for the adoption of these 
provisions in any other jurisdiction without their very substantial modification.") (citation omitted); id 
at 127 ("[nhe provisions of German law relating to de faCIO groups are unsatisfactory."). For discus­
sions of the German statutory group liability framework generally, see Antunes, supra note 4, at 223 
("In the more than twenty-five years that have passed since its enactment, it is quite clear that German 
group law has not succeeded in reaching its most basic legal policy goals in the treatment of par­
ent-subsidiary liability problems."); Wymeersch, supra note 12, at 588 ("As was ably stated by Hom­
melhoff and Druey, the German system is far from satisfactory. It is based on a valid theoretical con­
cept-that of balancing the profits and losses-but is unworkable in practice.") (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted). 
57 See Assmann, supra note 9, at 330 (commenting with respect to the juridical adoption of the 
qualified de facto group doctrine: "The principles established by case law in this connection ought in 
tum to have some repercussions on codified group enterprise law, speeding up processes of transforma­
tion there too"); Hofstetter, supra note 2, at 582 ("This is why many German commentators advocate a 
development of the German Stock Corporation Act along the 'qualified concern' device.") (citing 
EMMERICH/SONNENSCHEIN, KONZERNRECHT VoI.3.A, at 130, 149-52, 327-28 (1989), and Marcus 
Lutter, Die zivilrechtliche Haftung in der Unternehmensgruppe, in 11 Zeitschrift flir Gesellschaftsrecht 
[ZGR] 245,263-67 (1982»; see also PRESSER, supra note 6, § 4:3, at 4-15 ("The future for the veil 
piercing doctrine as applied to American limited liability companies, though uncertain at this time, 
might be expected to replicate the experience of the German limited liability company."). 
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regimes-whether they ultimately be entity or enterprise-based-which 
could be linked to the organizational substance of a given corporate group 
and, thus, could be formulated irrespective of the organizationalJarms (i.e., 
AG or GmbH subsidiaries) used in order to structure such group inter­
nally.58 
Such a clearly ambitious but also homogeneous system of intragroup 
liability rooted in the organizational substance of the business enterprise­
as well as the qualified de facto group doctrine itself-received a major 
setback in September 2001 when the Federal Supreme Court handed down 
a new landmark decision regarding the liability of corporate groups, the so­
called Bremer Vulkan decision.59 Bremer Vulkan was a major shipbuilding 
group in West Germany. It acquired an East German shipyard company, 
MTW, a GmbH, which the German Federal Government had privatized 
after the German reunification. As part of the acquisition, the Bremer Vul­
kan corporate group received substantial subsidies from the German gov­
emment-officially paid to MTW, the new subsidiary-under the condi­
tion that such funds would be used exclusively for the benefit of MTW. 
However, since the Bremer Vulkan group had a centralized 
cash-management system, controlled all financial decisions of MTW, and 
required MTW to join the central intragroup cash-management system, the 
subsidies were paid into the collective cash pool held with the parent com­
pany's treasury instead of being kept in a separate bank account held by 
MTW. In 1995, the Bremer Vulkan group encountered serious financial 
difficulties pursuant to which the cash-pool assets were lost in their en­
tirety, including all remaining MTW subsidies equivalent to approximately 
$410,000,000 at the time. MTW only survived such dispossession of its 
funds (as well as the subsequent bankruptcy and liquidation of the Bremer 
58 Cf ANTUNES, supra note 2, at 368 (stating that "intragroup liability schemes should be linked 
with the real organizational patterns of the group at stake rather than with its legal form"); Raiser, supra 
note 6, at 114 (stating in more general terms that "enterprise law is to be understood as a comprehen­
sive theory which embraces all autonomous enterprises without concern for their legal form or for the 
nature of their activity"); id. at 119 (explaining that the group provisions of the Stock Corporation Act 
aim "to be a general affiliated-entity law which, at least as a conceptual structure, no longer differenti­
ates on the basis of legal forms"). 
59 BGH (Sept. 17,2001 - II ZR 178/99), BGHZ 149, 10 = Die Aktiengesellschaft [AG], 47 
(2002), 43 = Betriebs Berater [BB], 56 (2001), 2233 = Oer Betrieb [DB], 54 (2001), 2338 = GmbH­
Rundschau [GmbHR], 92 (2001), 1036 = Monatsschrift fur Oeutsches Recht [MOR], 55 (2001), 1423 = 
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 54 (2001), 3622 = Neue Zeitschrift fur Gesellschaftsrecht 
[NZG], 5 (2002), 38 = Zeitschrift fur Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht (Wertpapier-Mitteilungen IV) [WM], 
55 (2001), 2062 = Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP], 22 (2001), 1874 (Bremer Vulkan). The first 
"signs of retrenchment" by the Bundesgerichtshofwere already evident in the so-called TBB decision in 
1993. See BGH, (Mar. 29,1993 -II ZR 265/91), BGHZ 122,123 = Betriebs-Berater [BB], 48 (1993), 
1103 = Oer Betrieb [DB], 46 (1993), 825 = Juristenzeitung [JZ], 48 (1993), 580 = Monatschrift fur 
Oeutsches Recht [MOR], 47 (1993), 427 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 46 (1993), 1200 = 
Zeitschrift fur Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht (Wertpapier-Mitteilungen IV) [WM], 47 (l993), 687. For a 
detailed discussion of the TBB decision and the "retrenchment," see Weber-Rey, supra note 38, at 528­
29; Wooldridge, supra note 29, at 632-37. 
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Vulkan grOUp) because the company was re-transferred by Bremer Vulkan 
to the German Federal Government and was later re-privatized after the 
injection of additional public funds.60 
This case seemed to have all the "bells and whistles" of parent­
company liability imposed under the qualified de facto concern doctrine. 
However, in explicitly reversing its earlier decisions, the Federal Supreme 
Court determined that the protective system offered by German corporate 
law to a controlled GmbH subsidiary against detrimental interferences by 
its parent shareholder should no longer follow the statutory liability system 
for corporate groups as created by the Stock Corporation Act for AGs61 and 
applied by analogy to GmbH subsidiaries under the qualified de facto 
group doctrine.62 Thus, with a single stroke, and without much, if any, 
explanation for its doctrinal reversal, the Federal Supreme Court effec­
tively abandoned the qualified de facto group doctrine63-a doctrine it had 
firmly established by a similar single stroke64 and which German corporate 
law had known for more than twenty years.65 
Instead, the Court held that such protection should be limited to the 
maintenance of the mandatory stated capital requirements-as applicable 
to the GmbH subsidiary under the German Limited Liability Company Act 
("Erhaltung ihres Stammkapitals"t6-and a guarantee of its legal and fac­
60 The plaintiff in this litigation was a special agency of the Gennan Federal Government in 
charge of privatizations following the Gennan reunification (UBundesanstalt for vereinigungsbedingte 
Sonderaufgaben"); it sued several members of the management board (UVorstand") of Bremer Vulkan 
Verbund Aktiengesellschaft, the ultimate parent company in the Bremer Vulkan corporate group. 
Liability Within Corporate Groups ("Bremer Vulkan'"): Federal Court ofJustice Attempts the Over­
haul, 3 GERMAN L.J. No.1, para. 2, (Jan. 1, 2002), at http;llwww.gennanlawjouma1.comlarticle. 
php?id=124 [hereinafter Overhaul] (on file with the Connecticut Law Review). 
61 See AktG §§ 291, 300-03, 311-18, translated in SCHNEIDER & HEIDENHAIN, supra note 1, at 
265-66,274-77,287-95. 
62 BGH (Sept. 17,2001 -II ZR 178/99), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 54 (2001), 3622 
(synopsis 1.) (Bremer Vulkan); see also Overhaul, supra note 60, para. 1. 
63 See Overhaul, supra note 60, para. 8; see also id para. 7 (referring to the decision as represent­
ing unothing less than a decisive disruption in the Court's reasoning with regard to the liability regime 
for corporate groups") (emphasis added). After some discussion among corporate law scholars in the 
aftennath ofBremer Vulkan, the Federal Supreme Court eventually confinned in a subsequent decision 
that it had meant to completely abandon its fonner qualified de facto concern liability doctrine. See 
BGH (Feb. 25,2002 - II ZR 196/00), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 55 (2002), 1803 (1805) 
(Bremer Vulkan II); see also infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. 
64 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
65 The first expression of such doctrine can be found in the Gervais decision of the Federal Su­
preme Court in 1979. See supra note 44. 
66 See Gennan Limited Liability Company Act [hereinafter GmbHG] §§ 30--31. In contrast to the 
corporate laws of the U.S. state jurisdictions, Gennan corporate law statutes require minimum stated or 
registered capital for stock corporations and limited liability companies. See Alting, supra note 2, at 
207; Lee & Blumental, supra note 2, at 227; Miller, supra note 2, at 95; see also supra text accompany­
ing note 41 (explaining that the Gennan limited liability company is more akin to the U.S. closely held 
corporation than to the U.S.-style LLC). 
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tual existence ("Gewiihrleistung ihres Bestandsschutzes").67 Such guaran­
tee seemed to imply, in effect, a rather expansive duty by a parent company 
to show sufficient consideration ("angemessene Riicksicht") for the sub­
sidiary's own, independent business interests ("Eigenbelange,,).68 Not­
withstanding such a broad statement which, at first sight, displays a strik­
ing similarity to the legal presumption formerly employed under the quali­
fied de facto group doctrine (i.e., lack of sufficient consideration and re­
spect for the independent business interests and autonomy of the subsidi­
ary),69 the Court in Bremer Vulkan merely held that a deficiency of suffi­
cient consideration clearly existed in the case at bar where the subsidiary 
was rendered incapable to pay its own debts due to the interference by the 
parent company. 70 
In two subsequent decisions in 2002 (Bremer Vulkan II and KBV)/' the 
Federal Supreme Court further refined and limited this completely revised 
liability strategy for corporate groups not governed by the Stock Corpora­
tion Act: Today, the direct liability of the parent company vis-a.-vis the 
creditors of its subsidiary ("AufJenhajiung")72 will only be imposed in cases 
in which the parent company's interference effectively destroys the contin­
ued, autonomous existence of the subsidiary ("existenzvemichtender Ein­
grifJ");73 in other words, where the subsidiary will either become immedi­
67 BGH (Sept. 17,2001 - II ZR 178/99), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 54 (2001), 3622 
(synopsis I.) (Bremer Vulkan). 
68 BGH (Sept. 17,2001 - II ZR 178/99), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 54 (2001), 3622 
(3623) (Bremer Vulkan) ("[A] guarantee of its legal and factual existence insofar as the sole share­
holder, while interfering with the assets and business opportunities of the controlled GmbH, is required 
to show sufficient consideration for those own, independent interests of the GmbH which are beyond 
such shareholder's disposition.") (original in German). 
69 See supra text accompanying note 48. 
70 BGH (Sept. 17,2001 - II ZR 178/99), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 54 (2001), 3622 
(syno~sis I.)(Bremer Vulkan). 
, BGH (Feb. 25,2002 - II ZR 196/00), BGHZ 150,61 = Betriebs-Berater [BB], 57 (2002),1012 
= Der Betrieb [DB], 55 (2002), 995 = GmbH-Rundschau [GmbHR], 93 (2002), 549 = Monatsschrift rur 
Deutsches Recht [MDR], 56 (2002), 1017 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 55 (2002), 1803 = 
Neue Zeitschrift rur Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG], 5 (2002), 520 = Zeitschrift fur Wirtschafts- und Bank­
recht (Wertpapier-Mitteilungen IV) [WM], 56 (2002), 960 = Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP], 23 
(2002),848 (Bremer Vulkan 11); BGH (June 24,2002 - II ZR 300/00), BGHZ 151, 181 = Betriebs­
Berater [BB], 57 (2002),1823 = Der Betrieb [DB], 55 (2002),1875 =GmbH-Rundschau [GmbHR], 93 
(2002),902 = Juristische Rundschau [JR] (2003),198 = Juristen-Zeitung [JZ], 57 (2002),1047 = Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 55 (2002), 3024 = Neue Zeitschrift fur Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG], 5 
(2002), 914 = Zeitschrift rur Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht (Wertpapier-Mitteilungen IV) [WM], 56 
(2002), 1804 =Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP], 23 (2002), 1578 (KBV). 
72 In contrast, "Binnenhaftung" describes the continued internal liability of the shareholder to the 
GmbH only, which is complimented by the external liability of the GmbH to its creditors who, accord­
ingly, have no direct recourse or claim against the shareholder. 
73 BGH (Feb. 25, 2002 - II ZR 196/00), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 55 (2002), 1803 
(\ 805) (Bremer Vulkan 11); BGH (June 24, 2002 - II ZR 300/00), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
[NJW], 55 (2002), 3024 (3025) (KBV); similarly, BGH (Sept. 17, 2001 - II ZR 178/99), Neue Ju­
ristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 54 (2001), 3622 (3623) (Bremer Vulkan) ("bestandsvernichtender 
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ately insolvent or where the parental interference will leave the subsidiary 
in a financial state of inevitable and almost instant collapse. According to 
the Federal Supreme Court in the KBV decision, the doctrinal foundation 
and justification for such liability strategy is the parent company's abuse of 
the corporate form of the GmbH ("Mif3brauch der Rechtsform der 
GmbH,).74 
IV. THE CHANGING PARADIGMS 
The abandonment of the qualified de facto group doctrine in the juris­
prudence of the Federal Supreme Court can be diagnosed as the symptom 
and, at the same time, the cause of a most fundamental and multi-faceted 
paradigm shift in the Court's core conception of the intragroup liability in 
highly centralized, non-contractual corporate groups not governed by the 
German Stock Corporation Act. Looking at its many layers and character­
istics, such paradigm change can be evaluated and recognized as both per­
ceptual in its nature, and conceptual in its resultant legal principles. 
A. The Perceptual Paradigm Shifts 
As is the case in most (if not all) civil law jurisdictions (as opposed to 
common law jurisdictions), a deeply ingrained, positivistic understanding 
still exists in German law that courts do not--even cannot--create legal 
rules but only interpret and apply the codified law which is already formu­
lated by the legislature and deemed comprehensive and conclusive (i.e., 
intended by design to address any and all potential cases that come within 
its respective regulatory tenet).75 Thus, by adopting the qualified de facto 
Eingrifj"); BGH, (Mar. 29, 1993 - 11 ZR 265/91), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 46 (1993), 
1200 (1203) (TBB). The KBV decision also held that the capital maintenance provisions are the exclu­
sive doctrinal basis of the liability for existenzvemichtender Eingriff, i.e., that the Court has given up 
the additional "Bestandsgarantie" (guarantee of legal and factual existence) justification used in 
Bremer Vulkan. BGH (June 24, 2002 - II ZR 300/00), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 55 
(2002),3024 (3025) (KBV). 
74 BGH (June 24, 2002 -11 ZR 300/00), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 55 (2002), 3024 
(syno~~is 1.) (KBV). 
See, e.g., NIGEL G. FOSTER & SATISH SULE, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LAWS 39 (2002) 
("The theoretical or formal function of the judiciary, which has developed in the German legal system, 
is that judges simply apply law and should not create it, therefore case law cannot stand as a source of 
law.... The courts clearly playa very important role as interpreters and developers of law ...."); 
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 264 (Tony Weir trans., 3d 
ed. 1998) ("Continental judges in Italy and France rather more than in Germany, are still imbued with 
the old positivistic idea that deciding a case involves nothing more than 'applying' a particular given 
rule of law to the facts in issue by means of an act of categorization; indeed, they often entertain the 
further supposition that ideally the rules of law to be 'applied' are statutory texts."); Rene David, 
Sources of Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, ch. 3, § 215, at 115 
(1984) ("The legal systems of the Romano-Germanic family of law have preserved the tradition that 
court decisions are not a source oflaw. In our day law takes the form of 'written law'. Its fundamental 
source is legislation .... The function of judges is to judge, not to make rules of law."); Basil S. Mar­
kesinis, Conceptualism, Pragmatism and Courage: A Cammon Lawyer Looks At Same Judgments of 
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concern doctrine, the German Federal Supreme Court arguably ventured 
out on fairly "thin ice.,,76 If there has been one shared comment among 
German corporate law scholars regarding such doctrine, it was that the 
Bundesgerichtshof and the lower German appeal courts-notwithstanding 
many landmark cases trying to firmly establish the doctrine-appeared to 
have been unable to arrive at an adequate formulation of the qualified de 
facto group doctrine which would have addressed, in a satisfactory manner, 
all possible liability aspects related to the qualified de facto concern.77 
Perceptually, it is therefore not surprising that the Federal Supreme 
the German Federal Court, 34 AM. J. COMPo L. 349, 359 (1986) ("Not every Common lawyer would 
dream of generalizing about the difficulties of German judicial style; but most would hold to the belief 
that civil law judges in general, and German judges in particular, tend to apply the Code, rather than 
make law. Interestingly enough, legal orthodoxy even in Germany would deny judges any pure law­
making powers."); § 12 Allgemeines BUrgerliches Gesetzbuch - AGBG (Austrian Civil Code of 1812) 
("Decisions taken in individual cases and judgments delivered by courts in specific cases never have 
the force of law and cannot be extended to other cases or other persons.") (original in German). Phi­
losophically, such understanding can be traced back, at least in part, to Montesquieu and his influence 
on the French Revolution (in tum, influenced by the reception of Roman law). See MONTESQUIEU, 
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 156 ~ 2 (David Wallace Carrithers trans., Univ. of California Press 1977) ("In 
republics the very nature of the constitution requires the judges to follow the letter of law. Here there is 
no possibility of interpreting a law against a subject, in case where either his property, honor, or life is 
concerned."); id. at 209 ~ 49 ("But as we have already observed, the national judges are no more, than 
the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings incapable of moderating either its 
force or rigor."); see also MAURO CAPPELLETII, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPEC­
TIVE 192 (1989); David, supra, ch. 3, § 215, at 15. Because of such understanding, there can arguably 
be no genuine "case law," i.e., 'judge-made" law, in Germany (or any other civil law jurisdiction) as 
such term would be commonly used and understood in common law jurisdictions. Nevertheless, Ger­
man legal scholars will often use and refer to the holdings of German appellate decisions, in particular 
those of the Federal Supreme Court, as "case law." See, e.g., Assmann, supra note 9, at 322 ("Thus, for 
instance, the vehicle for the development of German group enterprise law has for long not been the 
parliamentary legislator but case law led by legal science."); id. at 329 ("The regulatory lacuna filled by 
judge-made law, however, further demonstrates that the legislator is swamped when it comes to the 
codification of areas that are in development, involve a multiplicity of conflicting interests and presents 
little room for consensus, and therefore deliberately makes use of case law to determine and implement 
the need for 'juridification'. Case law in tum found lots of blanks on the map of group enterprise law, 
and rightly saw itself as compelled in doing its job ofjudicial rule-making to move beyond the regula­
tory approach offered by the group enterprise law of the Stock Corporation Act. ") (citation omitted); 
Hopt, supra note 25, at 83 (commenting on the then developing qualified de facto group doctrine in 
German jurisprudence: "A law of groups applicable to [limited liability] companies is emerging only 
more recently from case law"); Wiedemann, supra note 7, at 39-40 (predicting correctly in 1982 with 
respect to the possible enactment of a model law for the qualified de facto combination in Germany: "It 
is apparently not impossible that the courts in the next few years will 'enact' several of the individual 
elements of the proposed model as case-law"). 
76 However, the analogous application of the intragroup liability provisions under the AktG to a 
GmbH pursuant to the qualified de facto group doctrine was held constitutional by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (BundesverJassungsgericht-BVerfG). See BVerfG (Aug. 20, 1993 - 2 BvR 
1610/91), Der Betrieb [DB], 46 (1993), 1917 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 46 (1993), 
2600 = Zeitschrift flir Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht (Wertpapier-Mitteilungen IV) [WM], 47 (1993), 
1714 = Zeitschrift flir Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP], 14 (1993), 1306; see also PRESSER, supra note 6, § 4:4; 
Weber-Rey, supra note 38, at 529. 
77 Overhaul, supra note 60, paras. 1,6. 
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Court must have looked for ways which would allow it to retreat from the 
"thin ice" before it could be declared to actually formulate "case law," i.e., 
legal as opposed to interpretive rules which would be straying too far from 
and, therefore, could no longer be seen as an interpretation of a codified, 
statutory mandate. In other words, the working rule of the qualified de 
facto concern doctrine, created in analogy to the AG contractual group 
provisions in the German Stock Corporation Act, proved too much of a 
constructive stretch in order to still be confidently perceived as a result of 
either the mere juridical interpretation and "finding" of the law ("richter­
fiche Rechtsfindung") or the continual judicial development and construc­
tion of codified legal norms through authoritative, though non-binding 
precedents ("richterliche Rechtsfortbildung,,).78 In addition, the retreat or 
even retrenchment by the Bundesgerichtshof results in an abandonment in 
toto of any application of genuine corporate group liability concepts to the 
qualified factual concern. The Court not only dogmatically "shelters" the 
new intragroup compensation system of existenzvernichtender EingrifJ 
(i.e., an interference destroying the continued, autonomous existence of the 
subsidiary) by restraining its holding in the Bremer Vulkan and KBV deci­
sions to an almost mechanical application and enforcement of statutory 
safeguards for GmbH creditors which already existed under the Limited 
Liability Company Act. 79 But the Court's perception also exclusively shifts 
to the mandatory capital maintenance liability system under the Limited 
Liability Company Act. Such statutory system, however, applies to any 
GmbH company, i.e., it is completely blind and oblivious to factual in­
tragroup liability issues, namely whether the relevant GmbH is held by 
individual or corporate shareholders, whether the latter are investor or 
non-investor shareholders, and whether the GmbH is held within, or out­
side of, any corporate groUp.80 Apparently trying hard to show that it is not 
78 Cj David, supra note 75, § 2!8, at 116: 
In fact, however, case law plays a considerable role in many countries of the 
ROMANO-GERMANIC family. Not only does it often, under the guise of interpre­
tation, distort the rules enacted by the legislature, but judges find decided cases of 
such persuasive value that it is difficult not to see therein the acceptance of a pure 
rule of precedent. Each country still denies that such a rule exists and that decided 
cases are a source oflaw. 
Id. Nonetheless, one could have argued (before its abandonment) that the qualified de facto group 
doctrine was a form of "settled" case law by German courts (so-called "stiindige Rechtsprechung") and, 
thus, ~art ofcustomary law which is recognized as a source of law in Germany. 
9 In particular, the capital maintenance provision included in GmbHG §§ 3~31. 
80 Indeed, the Court's KBV decision, which provided much needed clarification and refinement of 
the Bremer Vulkan holding, was not a corporate group case. BGH (June 24, 2002 - II ZR 300/00), 
Neue luristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 55 (2002),3024. KBV, the GmbH subject to the detrimental 
shareholder interferences in the decision, was owned by a couple of individual (though non-investor) 
shareholders. Id. In addition, the Federal Supreme Court has expressly designed the new direct liabil­
ity scheme for existenzvemichtender EingrijJ only as a contingent liability ("Ausfallhaftung"), i.e., 
direct shareholder liability will only be the result if compensation for the detrimental shareholder inter­
ferences cannot be obtained directly between company and shareholder through the capital maintenance 
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doing anything extraordinary which could not be fully backed by the 
pre-existing statutory GmbH framework (and, arguably, while succeeding 
at this endeavor), already perceptually the Federal Supreme Court does 
something very extraordinary: It perceives intragroup liability concepts­
be they veil piercing or enterprise-liability oriented-as of no particular use 
for the qualified de facto group context. 
B. The Conceptual Paradigm Shifts 
Looking at the perceptual paradigm shifts, discussed above, through 
the "lens" of U.S. corporate law, it appears that-notwithstanding an ex­
clusive focus by the Federal Supreme Court on the capital maintenance 
provisions under the Limited Liability Company Act-the Court's recently 
adopted liability for existenzvernichtender Eingriff constitutes a form of 
veil piercing.81 Though the capital maintenance system provides the statu­
tory foundation, the Bundesgerichtshof has been careful to structure such 
liability as a piercing of the limited liability veil of the GmbH ("Durch­
griffshaftung" or "Auj3enhaftung") and has repeatedly stated, expressis 
verbis, that the limitation of the GmbH shareholders' liability pursuant to 
section 13(2) of the Limited Liability Company Act82 does not apply in 
cases of existenzvernichtender Eingriff.83 
Thus, if one agrees that such new direct liability strategy of the Federal 
Supreme Court qualifies, in substance, as veil piercing (at least, when ex­
amined through a U.S. corporate law "lens"), and if, in addition, one takes 
into account the Court's complete abandonment of the qualified de facto 
group doctrine, i.e., of a significant portion of the dualist fabric of German 
corporate group law as discussed earlier,84 then another fundamental, this 
time conceptual paradigm change emerges: The enterprise-liability ori­
ented, hybrid approach pursued by the qualified de facto concern doc­
trine-and any and all resemblances thereof-has been (apparently judi­
ciously) avoided by the Federal Supreme Court while substituting such 
doctrine with existenzvernichtender Eingriff. Thus, in cases of a GmbH 
protection mechanism of GmbHG §§ 30-31. See BGH (June 24, 2002 - II ZR 300/00), Neue Ju­
ristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 55 (2002),3024 (synopsis I.) (KEV). 
81 For a detailed description of the general German veil piercing jurisprudence outside the realm 
of corporate group law ("Konzemrecht") (which would be beyond the scope of this Article), see, for 
example, Alting, supra note 2, at 199-220; Singhof, supra note 15, at 148-63. 
82 This section prescribes the so-called "Trennungsprinzip," i.e., the principle of the separateness 
of the shareholders' and the company's respective asset spheres. GmbHG § 13(2) reads: "Only the 
company's assets are accountable for the liabilities of the company to its creditors." (original in Ger­
man). GmbHG § 13(2), translated in BURKHARDT MEISTER & MARTIN HEIDENHAIN, THE GERMAN 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 252-53 (5th ed. \988); see, e.g., Lutter, supra note 3, § 198, at 100; 
Singhof, supra note \5, at 146; Stohlmeier, supra note 14, at 136. 
83 See, e.g., BGH (June 24, 2002 - II ZR 300/00), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 55 
(2002113024 (synopsis I.) (KEV). 
See supra discussion Part II. 
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concern, piercing the corporate veil (i.e., "Durchgriffshaftung") has be­
come the Court's exclusive conceptual premise of direct shareholder liabil­
ity.85 Put bluntly, the application of genuine intragroup liability concepts 
(i.e., "Konzernhaftung") to the qualified GmbH group has become a thing 
of the past. 
Having discussed the symptomatic significance of the abandonment of 
the qualified de facto concern doctrine in order to better understand both 
the perceptual and the most critical (since veil piercing driven) conceptual 
paradigm changes in the Federal Supreme Court's notion of intragroup 
liability in qualified GmbH groups, two noteworthy consequences of such 
abandonment will be analyzed in the following which demonstrate how the 
conceptual force of such abandonment is likely to cause additional changes 
in the German law of corporate groups. Such changes can be expected to 
further encourage (at least, for the foreseeable future) the Federal Supreme 
Court's "deconstruction" ofthe dualist GmbH group liability archetype. 
1. 	 "Verhaltenshaftung" vs. "Zustandshaftung" vs. "Reine 
Verhaltenshaftung" 
Within the former doctrine of qualified factual groups as developed by 
the Federal Supreme Court, two branches of such doctrine had evolved 
over time in the BGH jurisprudence as well as in German corporate law 
scholarship:86 The first branch-so-called "Verhaltenshaftung" (conduct­
based liability)-argued that the doctrine should be applied only if, in addi­
tion to the qualified group relationship between parent company and sub­
sidiary (as evidenced by a permanent and pervasive control of the subsidi­
ary), the subsidiary was harmed by particular conduct of the parent, i.e., by 
a breach of the standards of diligent and orderly group management. 87 The 
second segment, called "Zustandshaftung" (status-based liability), consid­
ered it sufficient for imposing (strict, no-fault) parent liability that the 
qualified group relationship had been established.88 As has been discussed 
85 See generally Alting, supra note 2, at 197 ("Durchgriffshaftung refers to situations not gov­
erned by statutory or other legal rules in which an entity's existence is disregarded and the owner is 
held individually liable for the obligations of the company. This does not negate the legal entity itself 
even if the veil is pierced.") (citation omitted). 
86 For a detailed summary, see ANTUNES, supra note 2, at 372-76. See also Wooldridge, supra 
note 29, at 635-36. 
87 See BGH (Sept. 16, 1985 -II ZR 275/84), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 39 (1986), 
188 (synopsis 2. & 191) (Au/okran), pursuant to which intragroup liability would only be imposed if 
the parent company was unable to demonstrate that a manager of an independent GmbH, acting dili­
gently and orderly, would have conducted the business affairs at issue in the same manner. See Hopt, 
supra note 25, at 104-05; Schiess I, supra note 15, at 505; Stohlmeier, supra note 14, at 137. 
88 See ANTuNES, supra note 2, at 455. The status liability strategy was at least partially adopted 
in the so-called Video decision of the Federal Supreme Court (BOH (Sept. 23, 1991 - II ZR 135/90), 
BOHZ 115, 187 = Oer Betrieb [DB], 44 (1991), 2225 = Monatsschrift fur Oeutsches Recht [MOR], 45 
(1991),1148 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 44 (1991), 3142 =Zeitschrift fur Wirtschafts­
807 2005] THE LIABILITY OF CORPORATE GROUPS IN GERMANY 
in Part II above, such status-based liability, with its focus on the status of 
the organizational control and management structure of the group and no 
emphasis on any particular, detrimental conduct by the parent company, 
established a very powerful and compelling dualist strategy of intragroup 
liability in qualified concems.89 
The recent Bremer Vulkan90 and KBflYl decisions of the German Fed­
eral Supreme Court, however, are the complete opposite of such strategy. 
Not only do they signal a return by the German courts to conduct-based 
liability, i.e., requiring both pervasive control status and some sort of det­
rimental conduct, but thereby return to the "middle ground" of Verhalten­
shaftung. Bremer Vulkan and KBV, when considered in the aggregate, 
have gone much further and seem to establish that one singular, isolated 
exercise of control-with neither precedent nor repetition-will be suffi­
cient in order to create direct shareholder liability if such exercise consti­
tutes an existenzvernichtender Eingriff. Thus, in light of the terminology 
used to describe the two former branches of the qualified de facto group 
doctrine ("Verhaltenshaftung" and "Zustandshaftung"), this additional 
conceptual paradigm change caused by Bremer VulkanlKBV could be la­
beled, in a nutshell, "Reine Verhaltenshaftung" (pure conduct-based liabil­
ity): a liability system driven exclusively by a hermetically sealed cause­
and-effect analysis of each particular parental conduct and, thus, devoid of 
any determination of the factual corporate group status-i.e., the static and 
dynamic substance of its organizational control and management architec­
ture-or of any group status for that matter.92 
2. Old Casuistic Unpredictability vs. New Casuistic Unpredictability 
The basic, conceptual shift by the Federal Supreme Court to an entity 
law, veil piercing oriented approach to intragroup liability also originates a 
change in both the substance and the perspective of such Court's jurispru­
dential methodology which is likely to be applied and further refined in 
future parent liability cases. As is probably inevitable for any system of 
judge-made rules (be they actual legal rules or only interpretative, non­
binding "findings"), the development of the qualified de facto group doc­
trine has, at times, been described as a "source of a[n] unprincipled case­
law jurisprudence, largely casuistic in present cases and unpredictable in 
future cases. ,,93 How much easier (and methodologically less casuistic) it 
then seems to determine parent liability for existenzvernichtender Eingri.fJ, 
und Bankrecht (Wertpapier-Mitteilungen IV) [WM], 45 (1991),1837 = Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht 
[ZIP], 12 (1991),1330). 
89 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
90 See sources cited supra note 59. 
91 See sources cited supra note 71. 
92 See supra Part IV.A. 
93 ANTUNES, supra note 2, at 451-52 (citation omitted). 
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being such a narrow category of possible factual patterns, at least, as far as 
the factual consequences ofparental interferences are concerned, i.e., either 
insolvency or inevitable financial collapse. As has been discussed earlier, 
such new liability strategy indeed manages to avoid the pitfalls of the 
qualified de facto group doctrine which had faced the Federal Supreme 
Court, namely over-inclusive holdings and the creation of doctrinal "case 
law" without a sound statutory foundation in the German Limited Liability 
Company Act.94 
Notwithstanding such methodological substitution of the qualified de 
facto group doctrine, dogmatically existenzvernichtender Eingriff only 
marks the other end of the same spectrum-viz., the end exactly opposite 
such doctrine. There is a vast expanse of still mostly uncharted territory 
between them-an immense gray zone which one of the preeminent Ger­
man corporate law scholars, Professor Marcus Lutter, has once described 
"as large as the halo of a full moon in a foggy November night!,,95 Most 
corporate law scholars will probably agree that intentional interferences by 
the parent company which destroy, in absoluto, the legal existence of a 
GmbH subsidiary should trigger some form of direct parent liability to the 
otherwise frustrated creditors of such subsidiary.96 As such, existenzver­
nichtender Eingriff may describe the maximum level of possible detrimen­
94 See supra Part IV.A. 
95 ANTIJNES, supra note 2, at 371 (quoting and translating Marcus Lutter, Der qualifizierte fak­
tische Konzern, in Die Aktiengesellschaft, Zeitschrift fur das gesamte Aktienwesen [AG], 35 (1990), 
179 (184». Professor Lutter, who finds the U.S. veil piercing terminology poetic, see supra note 3, 
appears to allude here to the famous trio of almost identical "moonwatchers" paintings by the German 
Romantic painter Caspar David Friedrich (1774-1840): Two Men Contemplating the Moon (Zwei 
Miinner in Betrachtung des Mondes), 1819 (located at Gemaldegalerie Neue Meister, Staatliche 
Kunstsammlungen Dresden); Man and Woman Contemplating the Moon (Mann und Frau in Betrach­
tung des Mondes), ca. 1824 (located at Nationalgalerie, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin); and Two Men 
Contemplating the Moon (Zwei Miinner in Betrachtung des Mondes), ca. 1830 (located at The Metro­
politan Museum of Art, New York). SABINE REWALD, CASPER DAVID FRIEDRICH: MOONWATCHERS 
30-34 (2001). Tributes to the moon as a central motif of artistic inspiration was so strong in German 
Romanticism that the era has even been called the "lunar period" in German poetry, literature, and 
philosophy. /d. at 10. The earliest (1819) variation of Friedrich's "moonwatchers" paintings has been 
described to bathe the landscape and sky of a late-autumnal forest in an "all-pervasive, rust-brown 
haze." ld. at 30. The same all-pervasive, halo-caused haze applies here and might have inspired Pro­
fessor Lutter's comment. 
96 This is, in particular, when there is already an alternative cause ofaction pursuant to the capital 
maintenance liability system, set forth in GmbHG §§ 30-31. See BGH, (Mar. 29, 1993 - II ZR 
265/91), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 46 (1993), 1200 (1203) (TBB); Alting, supra note 2, 
at 23~0 ("A different situation exists where a parent is the sole member. According to most com­
mentators, a company has no rights per se as to its existence. They argue that a sole member, able to 
dissolve its company, owes no fiduciary duties to the company. Here, creditors can only resort to other 
rules such as GmbHG sections 30-32(b) (preservation of stated capital) ....") (citation omit­
ted); Wooldridge, supra note 29, at 630 ("The sole shareholder is not bound by any duty of good faith 
and, provided that he observes the rules contained in paragraphs 30 and 31 concerning the maintenance 
of capital, he may dispose of the property of the company freely, and the company has no remedy 
against him."). 
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tal interferences by a parent company in order to impose direct liability. 
But what about the minimum level, the much more crucial, regulatory bor­
derline where limited liability suddenly evaporates and a parent share­
holder can be held directly accountable?97 What about parental interfer­
ences with a less-destructive but still significant detrimental impact on the 
subsidiary? In modem corporate group reality, one can expect literally 
hundreds of factual patterns which are only a few, gradual steps removed 
from existenzvernichtender Eingriff98 For example, an interference by the 
parent company that significantly increases the risk of the subsidiary's in­
solvency but does not, by itself, immediately cause such result (so-called 
"Existenzgejiihrdung"t9could also become grounds for direct parent liabil­
ity. The same could be true in cases of "material" (also called "substan­
tial") undercapitalization of a GmbH, i.e., where the company's assets may 
still comply with the statutory capital maintenance protection under the 
German Limited Liability Company Act (otherwise called "formal" or 
"nominal" undercapitalization) but nonetheless will be inadequate in order 
to meet the subsidiary's actual and foreseeable operational expenses and 
financial needs, i.e., its cost of doing business. too 
97 See Antunes, supra note 4, at 215-16 (describing this issue as ''the question of where to place 
the decisive borderline between normal cases, in which the separateness of group constituent corpora­
tions will prevail, and exceptional cases, where the courts deemed justifiable the disregard of such 
separateness"). 
98 Where the ultimate elimination of the independent legal existence of the subsidiary ("Exis­
tenzvemichtung"), i.e., either insolvency or financial collapse, is somehow avoided in the eleventh hour 
(either autonomously by the subsidiary or through an intervening act by a third party or the same parent 
company) but which avoidance, in any case, will not neutralize the detrimental effects already caused to 
the fmancial situation of the subsidiary, including its almost inevitable avoidance costs. 
99 ExistenzgeJiihrdung means the endangerment of the independent legal existence of the subsidi­
ary. 
tOO See Singhof, supra note 15, at 164-65, stating before the Federal Supreme Court's decisions 
in Bremer Vulkan and KBV: 
Control may result in commingling of funds and material undercapitalization of the 
subsidiary (konzembedingte Vermogensaushohlung). Piercing the corporate veil 
may be allowed where a parent corporation completely strips the subsidiary of its as­
sets thereby rendering the subsidiary insolvent to the prejudice of creditors, or where 
the parent company intentionally schemes to squirrel assets into a liability-free sub­
corporation while heaping liabilities upon an asset-free sub-corporation. 
German court dockets, however, are nearly devoid of these types of piercing cases 
because the large body of German law governing affiliated companies (Konzem­
recht) endeavors to protect creditors and shareholders against typical dangers, such 
as unfair inter-corporate transactions .... That being so, in Germany, it is imperative 
that specific laws provide for the taming of majority shareholders---either corpora­
tions or individual entrepreneurs-who have significant business interests outside 
the corporation. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also PRESSER, supra note 6, § 5:5, at 5-10 (discussing 
nominal and material undercapitalization in Germany); Buxbaum, supra note 6, §§ 67-69, at 37 (dis­
cussing the modem trend toward examining "capitalization of the corporation (formal and actual) as the 
primary touchstone of the disregard concept"); Lee & B1umental, supra note 2, at 227 (discussing 
nominal and material undercapitalization in Germany) (citation omitted); Schiessl, supra note 15, at 
489-92. 
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All these open issues demonstrate that, with respect to the substance of 
the methodology used by the Federal Supreme Court in Bremer Vulkan and 
KEV, existenzvernichtender Eingriffmay not, and in all likelihood will not 
be the last word of the German courts with respect to intragroup liability 
outside of the statutory AG context. Rather, existenzvernichtender Eingriff 
will be the stepping-stone for what is predicted here to become a "meth­
odological feast of analogy," a new jurisprudential line of direct parent 
liability cases in those factual categories which will be found sufficiently 
analogous to existenzvernichtender EingrifJ in order to trigger the same 
legal result. lOl However, instead of a calibrated, systematic and structural 
response by the Bundesgerichtshof to the "halo" which today­
notwithstanding the Bremer Vulkan and KEV decisions (and arguably even 
more so because of such decisions)-still prevails around the qualified 
factual group phenomenon, it must be expected, de lege lata l02 and consis­
tent with the Court's pendulum shift to veil piercing paradigms, that the 
Federal Supreme Court will use the same casuistic, largely unprincipled 
and fragmental approach to direct parent liability as is characteristic for the 
veil piercing jurisprudence in the United States.103 Solvitur ambulandolO4 is 
101 See Singhof, supra note IS, at 174 (commenting before the Federal Supreme Court's Bremer 
Vulkan and KBV decisions: "It is clear, however, that additional protection of the corporate capital 
beyond the statutory protection of the stated capital is of paramount importance") (emphasis added); 
see also Alting, supra note 2 at 241 ("German courts and commentators agree that qualified de facto 
domination requires special protection for creditors."); Antunes, supra note 4, at 213-14 ("This hybrid 
nature of polycorporate enterprises soon brought about the crucial problem of the unsuitability to poly­
corporate enterprises of the traditional liability standards, designed by classical corporation law for the 
case of singlecorporate [sic 1enterprises. . .. It soon became apparent that the automatic extension of 
these old archetypes to the new reality of corporate groups led inevitably to untenable distortions and 
could not be applied indiscriminately without leading to grossly unfair results."). 
102 One could argue that with existenzvernichtender EingrifJbased on statutory capital mainte­
nance rules and its abandonment of the qualified de facto group doctrine, the Federal Supreme Court 
returned to an approach of judicial self-restraint which is more consistent with the governmental nmc­
tion of German courts because any attempt at a general, conclusive doctrine and liability system for 
intragroup liability in the GmbH concern should be undertaken by the German parliament. However, 
no reference to a need for such legislative action (similar to the promulgation of the German Stock 
Corporation Act in 1965) can be found in the new BGH decisions. 
103 With respect to the context of the BGH's qualified de facto group jurisprudence, compare 
ANTUNES, supra note 2, at 370 (diagnosing "a surprising similarity to the well-known unprincipled 
piercing-the-veil 'jurisprudence of metaphor and epithet' of US courts"); and, with respect to general 
German veil piercing jurisprudence outside the realm of corporate group law ("Konzernrecht"), com­
pare Singhof, supra note IS, at 174 ("The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil triggering equity 
holders' direct external liability to creditors remains an obscure safeguard for corporate creditors . . . 
. "). Singhof even argues that "veil piercing should be abolished" in Germany. Id. at 174. Professor 
Antunes' "metaphor and epithet" language referenced above has its origin in Professor Blumberg's 
much-quoted comment on the veil piercing law of the United States: 
This is jurisprudence by metaphor or epithet. It does not contribute to legal under­
standing because it is an intellectual construct, divorced from business realities. The 
metaphors are no more than conclusory terms, affording little understanding of the 
considerations and policies underlying the court's action and little help in predicting 
results in future cases. 
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the Court's new methodological motto. 
That such hermeneutical evolution in the group law jurisprudence of 
the Federal Supreme Court only substitutes the old casuistic unpredictabil­
ity under the qualified de facto group doctrine (which was created by an 
infinitely smaller "halo" composed by the lack of the Court's clarity re-
PHILLIP J. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF 
PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 8 (1983); see also BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, 
supra note 4, § 10.02[B]. This, in tum, is a terminological continuance of Justice Cardozo's famous 
words in 1926: "The whole problem of the relation between parent and subsidiary corporations is one 
that is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor." Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58,61 (N.Y. 
1926); see also WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE­
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 142 (8th ed. 2002) (characterizing U.S. veil piercing law as "ex­
ceedingly murky"); Alting, supra note 2, at 250 (describing general veil piercing rules in German and 
American law as producing "unpredictable and random decisions"); Frank Easterbrook & Daniel 
Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 89, 89 (1985) (stating, with respect 
to U.S. law, "[t]here is a consensus that the whole area of limited liability, and conversely of piercing 
the c0r&0rate veil, is among the most confusing in corporate law"). 
I It is solved in walking. See Thomas Mackay Cooper, The Common Law and the Civil Law-A 
Scot's View, 63 HARV. L. REv. 468, 470--71 (1950): 
A civilian system differs from a common law system much as rationalism differs 
from empiricism or deduction from induction. The civilian naturally reasons from 
principles to instances, the common lawyer from instances to principles. The civil­
ian puts his faith in syllogism, the common lawyer in precedents; the first silently 
asking himself as each new problem arises, "What should we do this time?" and the 
second asking aloud in the same situation, "What did we do last time?" ... The in­
stinct of the civilian is to systematize. The working rule of the common lawyer is 
solvitur ambulando. 
Id. This also shows that the working rule of civilian lawyers since the time of Lord Cooper, at least in 
today's complex world of corporate groups, has become very similar, if not identical, to the approach 
taken by their common law counterparts. See Roscoe Pound, What is the Common Law?, in THE Fu­
TURE OF THE COMMON LAW I, 18-19 (\937): 
For behind the characteristic doctrines and ideas and technique of the common-law 
laywer there is a significant frame of mind. It is a frame of mind which habitually 
looks at things in the concrete, not in the abstract; which puts its faith in experience 
rather than in abstractions. It is a frame of mind which prefers to go forward cau­
tiously on the basis of experience from this case or that case to the next case, as jus­
tice in each case seems to require, instead of seeking to refer everything back to sup­
posed universals. It is a frame of mind which is not ambitious to deduce the decision 
for the case in hand from a proposition formulated universally .... It is the frame of 
mind behind the sure-footed Anglo-Saxon habit of dealing with things as they arise 
instead of anticipating them by abstract universal formulas. 
Id.; see also Frederick W. Maitland, Outlines of English Legal History. 560-1600, in II THE COL­
LECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 438-39 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911). Maitland spoke 
of the methodological approach of English common law: 
King Henry and his able ministers came just in time--a little later would have 
been too late: English law would have been unified, but it would have been Roman­
ised. We have been wont to boast, perhaps too loudly, of the pure 'Englishry' ofour 
common law. This has not been all pure gain. Had we 'received' the Roman juris­
prudence as our neighbours received it, we should have kept out of many a bad mess 
through which we have plunged. But to say nothing of the political side of the mat­
ter, of the absolute monarchy which Roman law has been apt to bring in its train, it is 
probably well for us and for the world at large that we have stumbled forwards in 
our empirical fashion. blundering into wisdom. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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garding the precise factual prerequisites of corporate controly 05 with a new, 
exponentially larger and arguably also much less consistent casuistic un­
predictability of veil piercing paradigms,106 is also evident in the Court's 
newly adopted, methodological perspective. In Bremer Vulkan l07 and 
KBV,108 the Bundesgerichtshof establishes a new and exclusive focus on 
singular occurrences of parental interference and on the very limited, judi­
cially recognized consequences thereof (i.e., either insolvency or inevitable 
financial collapse) in order to impose veil piercing liability. The Court's 
perspective is therefore ex post, concentrating on conduct and operating in 
the same analytical fashion as would be applied to a case of straightfor­
ward, single-cause-and-effect tort liability. By putting the spotlight of its 
judicial review on the one particular issue which is sufficient to resolve the 
case (i.e., "Existenzvernichtung"), the Court inevitably neglects to doctri­
nally abstract, structure and systematize the many remaining control and 
interference aspects which characterize the living complexity of modern 
corporate groups. It thereby neglects to provide any legal guidance with 
respect to the organizational pianningl09 of corporate headquarters in order 
to minimize intragroup liability exposure. It is in this respect that the law 
of corporate groups in Germany still requires (and even more so after the 
abandonment of the qualified de facto group doctrine) "differentiated, yet 
operable,,,llo "properly tailored, yet enforceable,,111 normative criteria 
which, from an ex-ante perspective, help demarcatel12 the borderline of 
potential parent liability by focusing on the status and, thus, the specific 
static as well as dynamic organizational control and management arche­
types at work in modem business enterprises. 
In sum, the Federal Supreme Court's adoption of existenzvernichtender 
lOS See, e.g., ANTUNES, supra note 2, at 451-52; Hofstetter, supra note 2, at 583 (commenting 
that the qualified concern doctrine left open "many questions about its reach and applications"); Miller, 
supra note 2, at 107 ("[T]he court fails to provide guidance on the nature of the control that justifies the 
creation of a qualified De Facto Konzern and the imposition of liability upon the dominating business 
entity ...."); Wooldridge, supra note 29, at 638 ("However, as far as the rules governing qualified de 
[acto groups are concerned, some difficulties and ambiguities remain. Thus, the exact scope of these 
rules is not entirely clear and they may not prove suitable for transplantation to other jurisdictions."). 
106 Cf Antunes, supra note 4, at 215 (stating that "the major weakness of traditional orthodox 
'entity law' is the fact that it represents an unprinCipled regulatory strategy to intragroup liability prob­
lems, in which results are largely casuistic in present cases and almost unpredictable in future cases") 
(emphasis added); see also Alting, supra note 2, at 199 ("The general statements of the courts are not 
very conclusive, but they make clear that piercing the veil is decided on a case by case basis."). 
107 See supra note 59. 
\08 See supra note 71. 
109 Cf ANTUNES, supra note 2, at 450. 
I \0 Hofstetter, supra note 2, at 597. 
III [d. at 598. 
112 Cf Irnmenga, supra note 23, ch. 7, § 52, at 60 (stating that "[t]he consent of the participating 
companies, upon which contractual affiliations are predicated, provides a clear and categorical line of 
demarcation"). 
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Eingriff and its simultaneous abandonment of the qualified de facto group 
doctrine arguably signal a new era in its intragroup liability jurispru­
dence-the beginning of a period of recession for genuine Konzernrecht 
principles. However, its paradigmatic shift to a casuistic, incremental, veil 
piercing based system of direct shareholder liability seems methodologi­
cally inadequate in order to address the issue of intragroup liability in the 
(qualified) GmbH concern in an encompassing and, thus, satisfactory man­
ner. As with corporate veil piercing, this new jurisprudential, almost 
anti-doctrinal1l3 approach-adopted by the German Federal Supreme Court 
in trying to regulate modem qualified factual group reality-is geared at 
creating narrow factual categories where direct parent liability will only be 
imposed via the paradigmatic rule-exception technique of entity law. It 
therefore seems inevitable that, incrementally and over time, new catego­
ries (i.e., those recognized as sufficiently analogous to existenzvernichten­
der EingrifJ) will be crafted by the Court when it feels the need to do SO.114 
Like piercing "happen[ing] freakishly," this gradual imposition of direct 
113 Cf Alting, supra note 2, at 199 (stating, with respect to direct shareholder liability based on 
corporate veil piercing ("Durchgriffshaftung") in Gennany, that "it is commonly agreed that the tenn 
Durc'¥friffshajiung does not represent a particular doctrine of law"). 
4 This methodological approach correlates to the equitable nature and origin of corporate veil 
piercing rules in common law jurisdictions. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 6, at 330 (describing the 
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil as "a creation of nineteenth century equity jurisprudence under 
which equity courts disregard corporate fonns where required to prevent fraud"); see also I. MAURICE 
WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED CORPORATION PROBLEMS 44 (1927) 
("It has been oftentimes stated that courts of law invariably adhere to the entity theory even though 
gross miscarriages ofjustice result. It is quite true that equity, less abashed by fonns or fictions than a 
court of law, is more willing to draw aside the veil and look at the real parties in interest."); Cashel, 
supra note 3, at 20, 45 ("In reviewing the authorities mentioned above, the reluctance of courts to 
ignore the separate identity of corporation is apparent. Nevertheless, piercing the corporate veil con­
cepts, while perhaps imperfect, are available where equity requires.") (emphasis added). One of the 
now classic fonnulations of such casual, opportunistic (if not fatalistic) methodological style employed 
by appellate courts in common law systems and civil law jurisdictions alike is found in the 1966 Prac­
tice Statement of the House of Lords, allowing the court of last resort for England and Wales for the 
first time in English legal history to overrule its own, earlier decisions: 
Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation upon 
which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases. It provides at 
least some degree ofcertainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of their 
affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of legal rules. Their Lordships 
nevertheless recognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in 
a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law. They 
propose therefore to modify their present practice and, while treating fonner deci­
sions of this House as nonnally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it 
appears right to do so. 
Practice Statement, [1966] 3 All E.R. 77 (H.L.) (emphasis added). In addition, it can be expected that 
the Gennan Federal Supreme Court will only "feel the need to do so" ifno other viable avenue, i.e., no 
alternative cause of action (e.g., capital maintenance provisions, breach of fiduciary duties, fraud, 
misrepresentation, culpa in contrahendo, etc.), is available in order to impose direct shareholder liabil­
ity. In this respect, piercing the corporate veil in Gennany (i.e., "Durchgriffihajiung") has often been 
described as a complementary, ultima-ratio shareholder liability. See Alting, supra note 2, at 197. 
Thus, dogmatically as well as methodologically, it is inevitable for this liability approach to be inher­
ently erratic in the courts' application. 
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parent liability will be "rare, severe and unprincipled,"115 and a complete 
deconstruction of a once truly intermediate, dualist fabric in the German 
law of corporate groups. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that in conjunction with the abandonment of the 
qualified de facto group doctrine in the Bremer Vulkan and KBV decisions 
of the German Federal Supreme Court, such Court has also abolished an 
entire (and the most effective and relevant) area of the German law of cor­
porate groups ("Konzernrecht"). Today, there is no remaining Konzern­
recht for the type of corporate group which is by far the most prevalent in 
Germany, namely the GmbH group. As has been shown, this judicial de­
velopment is not a mere dogmatic and methodological course correction 
by the Federal Supreme Court. To the contrary, the Bundesgerichtshof 
(and, with it, the German law of corporate groups) has meticulously re­
vised its course and gone back the opposite way-making a complete 180­
degree turn and immediately leapfrogging to the paradigmatic junction 
facing German courts before Autokran was decided in 1985 (and estab­
lished a group law doctrine in Germany firmly rooted in enterprise-liability 
paradigms).116 With the adoption of existenzvernichtender Eingriff and the 
simultaneous abandonment of the qualified de facto group doctrine in 
Bremer Vulkan and KB V, GmbH Konzernrecht has lost its innovative mo­
mentum. Corporate veil piercing ("Durchgriffshaftung") has become the 
sole premise of direct parent liability in the GmbH concern. The most sig­
nificant area of German group law has retrenched from enterprise princi­
ples and is moving back to entity law paradigms. 117 
In addition-and equally perplexing-such dogmatic and methodo­
logical course inversion under Bremer Vulkan and KBVhas been designed 
lIS See the famous criticism of the U.S. veil piercing jurisprudence by Easterbrook & Fischel, su­
pra note 103, at 89 ('''Piercing' seems to happen freakishly. Like lightning, it is rare, severe, and 
unprincipled."). See also BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 4, § 1O.02[B] ("[W]e are 
faced with hundreds of decisions that are irreconcilable and not entirely comprehensible. Few areas of 
the law have been so criticized by commentators."); Antunes, supra note 4, at 216 ("Intragroup liability 
cases, where courts occasionally have disregarded the corporate entity of affiliate corporations and 
stepped over the corporate autonomy principle, imputing the acts or debts of subsidiaries to the parent 
corporation, are being decided according to guidelines that defy any possibility of rational systematiza­
tion or predictability."); E.1. Cohn & C. Simitis, "Lifting the Veil" in the Company Law of the Euro­
pean Continent, 12 !NT'L & COMPo L.Q. 189, 190 {I963)("The problem of 'lifting the veil' is known in 
Germany as that of the 'breaching of the wall of the corporation.' It is recognised that there are a 
number of cases when such a breach occurs. Many attempts have been made to find a principle behind 
the various lines ofcases. So far none of them have been successful."); sources cited supra note 103. 
116 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
117 Cf Blumberg, supra note 6, at 298 (observing a "movement from entity law to enterprise 
principles" in different areas of American corporate group law). In this respect, German group law has 
experienced a sudden reversal of the "emancipation of parent liability law from the constraints of tradi­
tional 'piercing' law." Hofstetter, supra note 2, at 597. 
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to completely abandon the application of group liability concepts in the 
German qualified de facto group context. As argued in Parts IV.A and 
IV.B.1, group status (i.e., the determination of the actual existence of a 
group affiliation and the potential control-dependency relationship in the 
first place, as well as of the specific factual embedment of the dependent 
subsidiary at issue within the organizational control and management sub­
stance of such corporate group in a second phase) is no longer relevant for 
the imposition of direct shareholder liability. By focusing on "group­
blind" capital maintenance requirements in crafting existenzvernichtender 
EingrifJ, the German Federal Supreme Court has avoided-unequivocally 
and systematically-drawing any distinction between factual situations 
involving parent-company shareholders (Bremer Vulkan) and fact patterns 
in which the shareholders are individual equity investors (KBV). Notwith­
standing the (perhaps recaptured) theoretical elegance l18 of such a universal 
approach, the evolution of direct parent liability in corporate groups, when 
reviewed comparatively, shows that indiscriminate, one-size-fits-all appli­
cations of veil piercing paradigms (including the recently adopted category 
of existenzvernichtender Eingriff) have proven inappropriate, individually 
and on aggregate, in order to develop parent responsibility systems that 
serve the "purpose of convenience and ... sub serve the ends ofjustice.,,119 
In light of the overwhelming historical evidence that universal, indiscrimi­
nate paradigms of shareholder liability do not work appropriately in the 
corporate group context (i.e., that there exists a legitimate regulatory need 
for genuine parent/group liability strategies),120 the German Federal Su­
118 See Antunes, supra note 4, at 226 n.95 (describing the qualified de facto group as "a hybrid 
fonn of corporate group which destroyed the theoretical elegance of the rigid two-stage regulatory 
framework"); see also ANTUNES, supra note 2, at 368. 
119 WORMSER, supra note 114, at 9-10 (commenting on the fiction of the corporate entity as a le­
gal person (persona jicta): "All fictions of law are introduced for the purpose of convenience and to 
subserve the ends of justice. When they are urged to an intent and purpose not within the reason and 
policy of the fiction, they must be disregarded by the courts"); id at 10 ("Fictions are invented and 
instituted for the advancement and promotion ofjustice, and will be applied for no other purpose."); see 
also Assmann, supra note 9, at 330 (commenting on the qualified de facto group "case law" of the 
BGH: "The normative view in case law mentioned earlier, in relation (but not only) to group situations, 
is expressed above all in the setting up of norms that serve the protection of the interests involved') 
(citation omitted) (emphasis added); lmmenga, supra note 23, § 33, at 39 ("As long as the decisions of 
one company can be determined by another, repercussions on the protective goals and fundamental 
principles of general company law can be expected.") (emphasis added); Lutter, supra note 3, § 202, at 
101 ("The generally recognized principle that members' liability for the company's obligations is 
limited ... has no fundamental value in and of itself. Rather it is practical legal strategy to promote 
honest business transactions and, like all regulatory strategies, it is therefore exposed to the danger of 
being ~~used for dishonest purposes.") (emphasis added). 
I See, e.g., BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 4, § 10.05 ("In brief, with some ex­
ceptions, the vision of the courts has been myopic. Because of concentration on the trees, consideration 
of the various types of forest has been neglected. In consequence, the rich variety of alternative doc­
trines under which American courts have recognized intragroup legal attribution in various areas of the 
law has gone unrecognized, and the judicial limitations arising from blunderbuss reliance on classic 
piercing to deal with the underlying problems have gone uncorrected."); BLUMBERG, supra note 6, at 
816 CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 37:785 
preme Court has yet to identify and pronounce, in express and elucidating 
terms, those legal reasons and public policy considerations which, in such 
Court's opinion, make corporate veil piercing in the form of existenzver­
nichtender EingrifJ(and the expected, subsequent categories ofDurchgrifJ­
shaftung developed by analogy) more convenient and-at the same time­
more just and protective for the various constituents of modern corporate 
groups and their respective interests than the normative equilibrium which 
had been accomplished (or which continued to be accomplishable) under 
the former qualified de facto group doctrine. 
Prior to the Bremer Vulkan and KBV retrenchment by the Federal Supreme 
Court, the German law of corporate groups had sometimes been hailed as 
136 ("As repeatedly emphasized in the various volumes of The Law o/Corporate Groups, cases arising 
in different areas of the law require analysis in terms of the underlying policies of the area under con­
sideration. The indiscriminate application of 'piercing the veil jurisprudence' as a universal concept 
has been one of its most serious limitations."); Alting, supra note 2, at 241 ("German courts and com­
mentators agree that qualified de facto domination requires special protection for creditors."); Antunes, 
supra note 4, at 213-14 ("This hybrid nature of polycorporate enterprises soon brought about the cru­
cial problem of the unsuitability to polycorporate enterprises of the traditional liability standards, de­
signed by classical corporation law for the case of singlecorporate [sic 1enterprises.... It soon became 
apparent that the automatic extension of these old archetypes to the new reality of corporate groups led 
inevitably to untenable distortions and could not be applied indiscriminately without leading to grossly 
unfair results."); Hofstetter, supra note 2, at 577 ("In his seminal, encyclopaedic work about corporate 
groups Professor Phillip Blumberg noted that one of the most serious limitations of United States law in 
dealing with parent liability has been the indiscriminate 'piercing the corporate veil jurisprudence' .") 
(citation omitted); Hopt, supra note 25, at 85 ("In some other countries the prevailing opinion is that 
the problems of the groups of companies can be solved by traditional civil law. In some of them not 
only specific legislation is lacking, the courts have not had the opportunity or the courage to develop 
their own rules for group problems. Most textbooks of company law neglect the group of companies 
almost entirely. As a foreign observer one almost has the impression that sometimes the phenomenon 
is virtually ignored. The separate entity doctrine is usually not challenged, to the detriment of the 
creditors of the (closely held) subsidiary. The interest of the outside shareholders are treated as being 
adequately provided for by the doctrine that account may not be taken of the group interest. "); id. at 
102-{)3 ("For groups of companies the separate entity doctrine cannot remain the final answer."); 
Immenga, supra note 23, § 49, at 58 ("The need to introduce a regime for affiliated groups would 
appear to be unavoidable, even though there are still many unresolved questions as to both principles 
and details."); Raiser, supra note 6, at 114 ("The law has become aware of the fact that the governance 
of an enterprise includes the exercise of power, and therefore requires legal mechanisms for its con­
trol."); Wymeersch, supra note 12, at 588-89 ("According to the prevailing European opinion, all fields 
of the legal system have been affected by the group phenomenon .... One of the central issues affecting 
groups of companies is the criterion of permissible group influence: is the subsidiary allowed to take 
account of the presence and even of the interest of the group, or should it be managed exclusively in its 
own interest? The answer to this question ... affects the liability of the group vis a vis third parties, 
especially creditors, and the relationship of the group towards minority shareholders as well."); id. at 
599 ("Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that in the longer term also, there will remain a need for 
group law, probably less for listed companies but mainly, but not exclusively, for unlisted ones."); 
sources cited supra note 101. For further discussion on the indiscriminate application of veil piercing 
paradigms under U.S. corporate law, see, for example, WORMSER, supra note 114, at 83 ("[C]orporate 
entity will not be ignored at law or equity simply because the number of stockholders is few, or even 
one, unless the circumstances are such as would warrant the same disregard of the entity were there ten 
thousand shareholders.") (emphasis added); Robert B. Thompson, Close Corporations in the United 
States 0/America, in THE EUROPEAN PRIVATE COMPANY? 187, 193 (Harm-Jan De K1uiver & Walter 
Van Gerven eds., 1995) ("Courts regularly pierce the veil within corporate groups, but somewhat 
surprisingly, the percentage of piercing is somewhat less than when the shareholder is an individual."). 
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an example for other legal jurisdictions,121 and it had been claimed that the 
significance and breadth of its example could not be fully understood by a 
mere examination of the statutory dualist fabric under the German Stock 
Corporation Act of 1965, discussed in Part 1. 122 Given the revival of corpo­
rate-veil piercing, i.e., entity-law paradigms in German group law (dis­
cussed in Parts III and IV) and the very limited practical utilization of the­
-on aggregate, almost comatose-concem liability rules under the German 
Stock Corporation Act (as discussed in Part 1), a truly (i.e., substantively) 
intermediate, dualist approach addressing the parent-subsidiary liability 
conundrum is no longer perceptible in German corporate law. For the 
foreseeable future, the once hailed example of the progressive, dualist 
qualified group fabric has been dismantled in its entirety. What remains is 
a mostly theoretical, dualist structure of enterprise liability under the Stock 
Corporation Act-a regulatory paper tiger. After forty years of struggle, 
corporate veil piercing has prevailed. 
121 See PRESSER, supra note 6, § 4:3, at 4-15 ("The future for the veil piercing doctrine as applied 
to American limited liability companies, though uncertain at this time, might be expected to replicate 
the experience of the German limited liability company."); Alting, supra note 2, at 250-51 ("Although 
imperfect, the German Konzernrecht, which was the first of its kind when promulgated in 1965, may be 
looked upon by other jurisdictions, such as the United States, as an example.") (citation omitted); 
Hofstetter, supra note 2, at 597 (concluding, with respect to the qualified de facto group doctrine, that 
such "German judge-made law in particular has projected a solution that might come close to an opti­
mal balance between maintaining the principle of limited liability and breaking it to the extent of a 
parent's management interference in subsidiary affairs"). But see Wooldridge, supra note 18, at 125: 
There is a general consensus that the provision of German law governing de facto 
groups and simple dependency relationships have not worked well, and have caused 
business men to make use of the defacto rather than the contractual groups. There is 
clearly no case for the adoption of these provisions in any other jurisdiction without 
their very substantial modification. 
Id. (emEhasis added) (citation omitted). 
I 2 See Hopt, supra note 25, at 83-85: 
In Germany, legal discussion of groups of companies began in 1910 and was particu­
larly intense between the two world wars. The German Konzernrecht of 1965 has to 
be seen against this background. It is not a sudden original postwar invention. Le­
gal development did not cease in 1965. German courts and authors have discovered 
serious shortcomings of the 1965 Act as far as stock corporations are concerned. 
Furthermore, they no longer accept that the German legislator has enacted a law of 
groups for stock corporations only, leaving aside other forms of companies such as 
the GmbH .... Legal developments in the latter area are far more dynamic than in 
the field of traditional stock corporation law .... Thus it should be evident that if a 
foreign lawyer simply examined the 1965 Act, he would have a very misleading pic­
ture of the German law of groups. 
Id. 
